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“If you aint cheating, you aint trying.”
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In the wake of the collapse of Lincoln Savings and Loan in 1989 and
again after the implosion of Enron and WorldCom in 2001, Judge Stanley
Sporkin famously asked, “Where were the lawyers?” Section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposed new duties on in-house counsel to
report up violations of law. Yet, we still had the LIBOR and foreignexchange rigging scandals, which had, by 2015, led to multi-billion dollar
settlements and fired bank CEOs in England and Germany; rampant insider
trading by hedge funds and corporate titans; the subprime mortgage crisis;
the option backdating scandals; and massive recalls by automotive
manufacturers Toyota, General Motors, and Volkswagen. We submit that
legislation and regulatory action alone are, and will continue to be,
insufficient to deter corporate misconduct of the sort we have experienced
in the last two decades. As in-house counsel have become more
entrepreneurial in both the United States and elsewhere, and as many
business schools have failed to adequately prepare future managers to
address the legal and ethical aspects of business, more attention must be
focused on the internal forces within companies. In addition to addressing
Judge Sporkin’s question, we must ask, “Where were the managers?” In
this Article, we provide new data on the role of in-house counsel in Sweden
and assert that counsel and managers can be more effective drivers of both
compliant corporate behavior and the creation of sustainable value if they
work together as strategic partners, that is, when corporate managers are
legally astute and are advised by strategically astute counsel.
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INTRODUCTION

In May 2015, Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase, Barclays, and the Royal
Bank of Scotland agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to manipulate the
price of U.S. dollars and euros exchanged in the foreign currency exchange
spot market.3 They agreed to pay criminal fines in excess of $2.5 billion.4
The Federal Reserve imposed an additional $1.6 billion combined fine on
those four banks, plus UBS, following its own foreign exchange
investigation.5 Barclays settled related claims with other regulatory bodies
for another $1.3 billion.6 Reflecting the “brazen” nature of the scheme, one

3. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty
Pleas (May 20, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-levelguilty-pleas [perma.cc/Y4ZB-DYBT].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. See also Lianna Brinded, The Fired Barclays CEO Had Two Nicknames Inside
the Bank that Tell You Why He Was Forced Out, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 8, 2015, 10:04 AM),
http://uk.businessinsider.com/barclays-ceo-antony-jenkins-left-because-of-his-lack-of-
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Barclays’ trader had written in an online chat room, “if you aint cheating,
you aint trying.”7
The foreign exchange fines are in addition to the more than $5 billion
imposed on Deutsche Bank, UBS, Royal Bank of Scotland, and other banks
to settle charges of illegally rigging the London inter-bank lending rate
(“LIBOR”), which is the lending benchmark for everything from student
loans to commercial paper.8 Heads rolled: Juergen Fitschen and Anshu
Jain, the co-chief executives of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest lender,
announced their resignations in June 2015, only weeks after Deutsche Bank
agreed to pay a $2.5 billion fine in connection with its role in the LIBOR
scandal.9 This was in addition to the roughly $1.6 billion the bank reserved
in the first quarter of 2015 for related legal fees.10 Bob Diamond, the chief
executive of Barclays, was an early casualty of the LIBOR affair—he was
forced to resign in July 2012, after regulators fined the London-based bank
£290 million ($455 million) for manipulating LIBOR.11 Regulators faulted
Diamond for fostering a “toxic culture”; British politicians called him
“rotten,” “grossly incompetent,” and “complicit and negligent.”12 That

investment-banking-understanding-2015-7#ixzz3jCMDPi96
[perma.cc/NR3S-88UQ]
(stating Barclays paid “£3.7 billion ($5.7 billion) in currency market manipulation litigation
costs in 2014 as well as costs associated with dealing with a number of retail investor misselling scandals and writedowns from property loan portfolios.”).
7. Titcomb, supra note 1.
8. See John Kiff, Back to Basics: What is LIBOR?, 49 INT’L MONETARY FUND 4, Dec.
2012, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/12/basics.htm [perma.cc/9BJF-U89T]
(“LIBOR’s importance derives from its widespread use as a benchmark for many other
interest rates at which business is actually carried out.”).
9. Eyk Henning, David Enrich & Jenny Strasburg, Deutsche Bank Co-CEOs Jain and
Fitschen Resign, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2015, 11:57 a.m. ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
deutsche-bank-co-ceos-to-announce-resignations-1433674815 [perma.cc/235W-UTJP].
10. Jack Ewing, Deutsche Bank Profit Falls on Legal Costs, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 26,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/business/dealbook/deutsche-bank-profit-fallson-legal-costs.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/TW8C-ZZAT]. Companies sometimes must also cut
their capital expenditures because of illegal activity to be able to pay for resulting fines and
litigation fees. See, e.g., Victor Luckerson, Volkswagen Will Cut $1 Billion in Spending
After Cheating Scandal, TIME (Nov. 20, 2015), http://time.com/4122514/volkswagen-willcut-1-billion-in-spending-after-cheating-scandal/
[perma.cc/C9RU-Q8YS]
(describing
Volkswagen’s cost spending as a result of paying for a cheating scandal).
11. Liam Vaughan & Ambereen Choudhury, Barclays CEO Quits After Record LiborRigging Fine, BUSINESSWEEK (July 3, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201207-03/barclays-ceo-quits-after-record-libor-rigging-fine [perma.cc/5UYB-AFKR].
12. Brinded, supra note 6. The Barclays’ board hired Antony Jenkins, a retail banker
whose nicknames included “Mr. Nice,” as Diamond’s successor in 2012 to restore the
bank’s tattered reputation. Jenkins measured performance by and pegged bonuses to
compliance with “a set of core values, including integrity and respect for others,” and started
to gut the investment banking operations, a historic money maker. After Barclays’ stock
continued to languish, the board replaced Jenkins with a new executive chair John
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same year, the Swiss bank, UBS, paid regulators $1.5 billion to settle
similar charges.13 In 2013, the European Commission fined Deutsche
Bank, Barclays, Société Générale, the Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS,
JPMorgan, Citigroup, and RP Martin a combined €1.71 billion (about $2.3
billion) to settle similar charges.14 In September 2015, Goldman Sachs,
together with some of Wall Street’s biggest financial institutions, agreed to
a $1.87 billion settlement with investors to resolve allegations that the
firms conspired to limit competition in the lucrative credit-default swaps
market.15 British multinational bank, HSBC, agreed in 2012 to pay a
record $1.92 billion to settle international money laundering charges.16
In an effort to combat illegal conduct by senior executives of banks
operating in Britain, British regulators announced in mid-2015 that bonuses
paid to such executives could be clawed back, that is, confiscated, for up to
McFarlane in July 2015. Id. McFarlane indicated that Jenkins “hadn’t done anything
wrong . . . he’s just not the right person to take us forward.” Id. McFarlane charged:
“Barclays is not efficient, we are not productive, we are cumbersome.” Id. He continued:
“We have [a] very large bureaucracy and personal accountability is not as high as we need it
to be. And so it’s not just a reduction in costs, it’s a change in the way we do things that’s
required here.” Id.
For his part, Jenkins commented:
In the summer of 2012, I became Group Chief Executive at a particularly
difficult time for Barclays. It is easy to forget just how bad things were three
years ago both for our industry and even more so for us. I am very proud of the
significant progress we have made since then. Most of all, I am proud that we
have defined our culture through a common set of values for the Group and that
the progress we have made and the tough decisions we have needed to take have
all been achieved by applying these values and by focusing on the needs of all
our stakeholders.
Id. It remains to be seen whether McFarlane can combine the high-flying Barclays under
Diamond, when “Barclays was all about risk, high returns, and a focus on cutting-edge
trading technology,” with the values-driven culture under Jenkins. Id.
13. David Enrich & Jean Eaglesham, UBS Admits Rigging Rates in ‘Epic’ Plot, WALL
S T.
J.
(Dec.
20,
2012,
7:17
a.m.
ET),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324407504578188342618724274
[perma.cc/QR9B-X9XW].
14. Lianna Brinded, Libor Fixing Scandal: Deutsche Bank ‘Braces Itself’ for €1bn US
and UK Fine, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014, 15:18 BST), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/liborfixing-scandal-deutsche-bank-braces-1bn-us-uk-fine-1471650 [perma.cc/BJ6A-PG7U].
15. See Jesse Drucker & Bob Van Voris, Wall Street Banks to Settle CDS Lawsuit for $1.87
Billion, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201509-11/wall-street-banks-reach-settlement-on-cds-lawsuit-lawyer-says [perma.cc/YG69R73Z] (describing Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and HSBC’s
settlement).
16. See Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle
Charges of Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012, 4:10 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/hsbc-said-to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-overmoney-laundering/ [perma.cc/6CQC-ERY8].
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ten years after any misconduct.17 Martin Wheatley, chief executive of
Britain’s Financial Conduct Authority, called this “a crucial step to rebuild
public trust in financial services and allows firms and regulators to build
long-term decision-making and effective risk management into people’s
pay packets.”18
Sweeping insider trading charges against Wall Street titans resulted in
criminal sentences for once-venerated figures.19 They include Rajat Gupta,
the former head of McKinsey & Company and a former board member of
Goldman Sachs,20 and hedge fund mogul Raj Rajaratnam of the now
defunct Galleon Group (in its time, one of the world’s largest hedge
funds).21
Beyond draining a firm’s financial capital and landing its executives
in prison, ethical lapses in judgment can deplete a firm’s reputational
capital, in some cases tarnishing the brand irreparably. Even though the
Supreme Court ultimately exonerated Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen, of
securities fraud, that ruling came too late to save the venerable accounting
firm.22
The brands of multiple automobile companies have been eroded by
the sale of unsafe or non-compliant vehicles. In 2014, Toyota paid a record
$1.2 billion fine to settle U.S. government charges related to as many as
eighty-nine deaths allegedly caused by “unintended acceleration.”23

17. Chad Bray, British Regulators Extend Clawback Rules for Bankers’ Pay, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/business/dealbook/britainbonuses-banks.html [perma.cc/U7A7-NTAG].
18. Id.
19. See Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Rajat Gupta Convicted of Insider Trading,
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/rajat-gupta-convictedof-insider-trading/?_r=0 [perma.cc/9QTF-ZAF6] (noting that United States attorney for
Manhattan Preet Bharana charged “66 Wall Street traders and corporate executives . . . with
insider trading” from 2009 to 2012).
20. See id. (describing Gupta as the “most prominent corporate executive convicted in
the government’s sweeping investigation into insider trading.”).
21. Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Hedge Fund Billionaire is Guilty of Insider
Trading, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2011, 10:50 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/
rajaratnam-found-guilty/ [perma.cc/G9LH-LXAA].
22. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
23. Alex Davies, Toyota Will Pay $1.2 Billion to Settle Criminal Investigation Over
Unintended
Acceleration
Case,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Mar.
19,
2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/toyota-to-pay-12-billion-in-unintended-acceleration-case2014-3; Associated Press, Sudden Acceleration Death Toll Linked to Toyota Rises, N.Y.
TIMES (May 25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/business/26toyota.html
[perma.cc/T5ZS-X5EH]. See also COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSPORTATION,
DANGER BEHIND THE WHEEL: THE TAKATA AIRBAG CRISIS AND HOW TO FIX OUR BROKEN
AUTO
RECALL
PROCESS
23
(June
22,
2015),
http://business.cch.com/plsd/SenateTakataAirBagReportJune2015.pdf
[perma.cc/DK2P-
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Former Attorney General Eric Holder called Toyota’s conduct “shameful”
and said it “showed a blatant disregard for . . . the safety of consumers”
and was “a clear and reprehensible abuse of the public trust.”24 In yet
another automobile industry debacle, Martin Winterkorn, the CEO of
Volkswagen AG, resigned in September 201525 after the company
“admitted that it had installed . . . software created to cheat on emissions
tests in 11 million of its vehicles worldwide, setting off one of the largest
corporate scandals in the auto industry.”26 The illegal software permitted
diesel-powered vehicles to pass emissions tests when they actually were
emitting nitrogen oxide at “up to 40 times the federal standard.”27
According to the BBC, “The company admitted to ‘totally screwing up’,
and there has been a shake-up in the management structure and personnel
as a result.”28 Winterkorn acknowledged responsibility, but said: “I am not
aware of any wrongdoing on my part.”29 On January 4, 2016, the U.S.
Department of Justice sued Volkswagen AG, Audi AG, Porsche AG, and
certain American subsidiaries for alleged violations of Sections 203 and
204 of the Clean Air Act,30 including “[s]elling, introducing into
commerce, or importing into the United States motor vehicles that are
designed differently from what Volkswagen had stated in applications for
certification to EPA and the California Air Resources Board (CARB).”31
KG97] (report on the Takata’s malfunctioning airbags).
24. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General Eric
Holder at the Press Conference Announcing Criminal Charges and Deferred Prosecution
Agreement
with
Toyota
Motor
Corporation
(Mar.
19,
2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-prepared-delivery-attorney-general-eric-holderpress-conference-announcing [perma.cc// WX2C-AKE7].
25. See Thad Moore, Volkswagen CEO Quits Amid Emissions-Cheating Scandal,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
23,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/volkswagen-ceo-resigns-afteremissions-cheating-scandal-spreads/2015/09/23/6b09e540-6203-11e5-8e9edce8a2a2a679_story.html [perma.cc/9F9J-R37W] (“VW acknowledged this week that 11
million of its vehicles worldwide . . . pass emissions tests while emitting nitrogen oxide at
up to 40 times the federal standard.”).
26. Coral Davenport & Danny Hakim, U.S. Sues Volkswagen in Diesel Emissions
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2016, at B1.
27. Moore, supra note 25.
28. VW Sued by US Justice Department, BBC (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/
news/business-35227435 [perma.cc/MP4P-RPR4].
29. Moore, supra note 25.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7523, 7524 (2012).
31. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, United States Files Complaint Against
Volkswagen, Audi and Porsche for Alleged Clean Air Act Violations (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-complaint-against-volkswagen-audi-andporsche-alleged-clean-air-act [perma.cc/DPN5-B6XQ]. The complaint in United States v.
Volkswagen AG is available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/809826/download
[perma.cc/3LE4-MTHC].
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The Justice Department indicated that “the complaint represented the
first step in legal action against Volkswagen and did not preclude a
criminal charge or the targeting of specific executives.”32 Regulators in
Germany, India, and South Korea are also investigating Volkswagen’s
deceptive practices.33 The company has already reserved more than $7
billion to cover recall costs, and experts predict the final costs will be
“much higher than that.”34
As of October 2015, BP’s 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig
explosion—which resulted in eleven fatalities35 and represented the largest
marine oil disaster in history36—had resulted in a nearly $54 billion pre-tax
charge for the company.37 Included in that amount is a $5.5 billion fine for
violating the Clean Water Act.38 Two BP Deepwater Horizon supervisors
were indicted for involuntary manslaughter in a 23-count indictment, which
“accuses them of mishandling an important safety test and failing to report
abnormally high pressure readings that attorneys say were obvious signs of
an impending disaster.”39 Critics blame BP’s consistent pattern of unsafe
behavior on a flawed corporate culture that condones such conduct.40
Of even more significance to companies than monetary damages and
impaired reputational capital can be the diminishment of moral capital due
to unethical behavior. Moral capital is critical to long-term firm success;
once lost, it is very difficult to regain. Working for an employer that is
ethical is important to millennials. A 2013 survey conducted by Bentley
University found that 85% of millennials want to work for a socially

32. Davenport & Hakim, supra note 26, at B3.
33. Id.
34. VW Sued by US Justice Department, supra note 28. See also Mark Thompson &
Chris Liakos, Volkswagen CEO Quits over ‘Grave Crisis’, CNN MONEY (Sept. 23, 2015,
12:43 PM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/23/news/companies/volkswagen-emissionscrisis/ [perma.cc/K4D4-QHUU] (“The company faces civil and possible criminal fines in
the U.S. that are likely to total billions of dollars.”).
35. See Mary Flood, Jury’s Out on Edge for Lawyers Who’ve Battled BP Before,
HOUSTON CHRON. (May 23, 2010) (reporting fifteen BP workers were killed in an explosion
at its Texas City refinery in 2005).
36. See Emily Atkin, BP Rig Supervisors Must Face Manslaughter Charges for
Deepwater Horizon Deaths, Judge Rules, CLIMATEPROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2014, 11:46 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/01/29/3220691/deepwater-death-jury/
[perma.cc/YS28-K88D] (discussing the charges against Deepwater Horizon).
37. Susan Heavey, U.S. Says BP to Pay $20 Billion in Fines for 2010 Oil Spill,
REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2015, 2:09 EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bp-usaidUSKCN0RZ14A20151005 [perma.cc/3LBA-KYFB]
38. Id.
39. Atkin, supra note 36.
40. See generally Jad Mouawad, For BP, a History of Spills and Safety Lapses, N.Y.
TIMES (May
8,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/09bp.html?
pagewanted=all [perma.cc/PJ8L-HY4V] (detailing BP’s previous safety lapses).
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responsible or ethical company, with 95% indicating that a company’s
reputation is important.41 More than half of the respondents indicated that
they have concerns about “whether most businesses do the right thing.”42
Corporate scandals of this scale are certainly not unprecedented,
though they appear to be happening more frequently. There was roughly a
ten-year gap between the savings and loan (“S&L”)43 and insider trading
scandals44 in the 1980s and the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in 2001.
The demise of these and other former high flyers was followed in relatively
short order by the hedge fund insider trading scandals that began with a tip
in 2007 about hedge fund trader Rengan Rajaratnam,45 then the subprime

41. See Rob Asghar, Study: Millennials’ Work Ethic Is in the Eye of the Beholder,
FORBES.COM (Jan. 29, 2014, 10:21 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robasghar/2014/
01/29/study-millennials-work-ethic-is-in-the-eye-of-the-beholder/ [perma.cc/V8DZ-WP6L]
(noting more than 3,000 individuals participated in the October 2013 survey, including
students, recent college graduates, parents, and employers).
42. Id.
43. See generally FDIC, 1 AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND
EARLY 1990S 168, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf [perma.cc/
6YVD-JD2Z] (last visited Dec. 24, 2015) (The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) estimated that it cost “just over $160 billion, including $132 billion from federal
taxpayers,” to bail out failed savings and loans (“S&Ls”). The FDIC explained, “believing
that the marketplace would provide its own discipline, the government used rapid
deregulation and forbearance instead of taking steps to protect depositors. The government
guarantee of insured deposits nonetheless exposed U.S. taxpayers to the risk of loss—while
the profits made possible by deregulation and forbearance would accrue to the owners and
managers of the savings and loans.” Of the 1,043 S&Ls that failed from 1986 to 1995,
Lincoln Savings and Loan was the largest.). See also Robert D. McFadden, Charles
Keating, 90, Key Figure in ‘80s Savings and Loan Crisis, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/business/charles-keating-key-figure-in-the-1980ssavings-and-loan-crisis-dies-at-90.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/2CA8-K9NM] (explaining that
twenty-thousand customers “were left holding $250 million in worthless bonds, the life
savings of many.”). Even though Lincoln’s expert Alan Greenspan had opined before he
became chair of the Federal Reserve Board that Lincoln’s depositors faced “no foreseeable
risk,” U.S. taxpayers ultimately had to pay $3.4 billion to cover the S&L’s depositors’
losses. Id. Its CEO, Charles Keating, was convicted in 1992 of racketeering, fraud, and
conspiracy and went to prison for four and a half years. Although his convictions were
overturned on appeal in 1996, Keating pleaded guilty in 1999 to four counts of wire and
bankruptcy fraud, at which point he was sentenced to time already served. Id.
44. See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991) (detailing insider trading
scandals).
45. See Matthew Goldstein, Ben Protess & Rachel Adams, Prosecutors’ Winning
Streak on Insider Trading Cases Ends, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/jury-clears-rengan-rajaratnam-in-insider-tradingcase/ [perma.cc/TGQ4-YZQR] (discussing the 2007 tip led to the 2009 arrest of Rengan’s
older brother Raj Rajaratnam, the co-founder of the Galleon Group hedge fund, and his
2011 conviction. In July 2014, after securing eighty-five insider trading convictions and
guilty pleas, the government’s “winning streak” ended when Rengan Rajaratnam was found
not guilty of conspiracy to commit insider trading with his brother.).
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mortgage crisis in 2008, the LIBOR rigging scandals in 2012, and then the
foreign exchange manipulation cases.
After each new financial crisis in the United States, Congress has
enacted new legislation “to address the perceived causes of the crisis.”46
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933,47 the Securities Act of
1933,48 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193449 in response to the Stock
Market Crash of 1929. It enacted the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”)50 after the “S&L
debacle,”51 which cost “just over $160 billion, including $132 billion from
federal taxpayers,” to bail out failed savings and loans (“S&Ls”), which
had made increasingly risky investments to shore up their depleted
reserves.52 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)53
after the implosion of Enron, WorldCom,54 and Tyco, and other corporate
scandals,55 then enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)56 in the wake of the subprime
mortgage crisis.

46. Kabir Ahmed & Dezso Farkas, A Proposal to Encourage Up-the-Ladder Reporting
by Insulating In-house Corporate Attorneys from Managerial Power, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L.
861, 863 (2015).
47. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
48. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a –
77mm).
49. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a –
78kk).
50. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
51. FDIC, supra note 43, at 167.
52. Id. at 187.
53. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201 et seq. (2003). Suraj Srinivasan, the coauthor, with John C. Coates IV, of SOX after Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review, 28
ACCT. HORIZONS 627 (2014), concluded: “‘Markets have been able to use the information to
assess companies more effectively, managers have improved internal processes, and the
internal control testing has become more cost-effective over time.’” (quoted in Julia Hanna,
The Costs and Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, FORBES (Mar. 10, 2014, 11:15 AM)),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2014/03/10/the-costs-and-benefits-ofsarbanes-oxley/ [perma.cc/CE5E-JKWL]) (explaining that 33% of large-company chief
financial officers surveyed by the Financial Executives Research Foundation in 2005 agreed
that SOX had reduced fraud).
54. See Ahmed & Farkas, supra note 46, at 863 (discussing the history of financial
scandals).
55. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 985-86 (2005) (discussing financial fraud by
corporations).
56. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78o).
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Notwithstanding the passage of SOX and the enactment of the SEC
regulations thereunder, “the financial crisis of 2008 still happened.”57 As
the co-author of a study of the ten-year effect of SOX stated, “The big,
unanswered question is whether SOX-related changes had any impact in
the lead-up to the financial crisis [of 2008]. Did it make things better or
worse?”58 He continued, “We don’t know the answer to that. We only
know that there were benefits in terms of financial reporting and corporate
governance; that costs of implementation were higher for smaller
companies; and that concerns about risk-taking and investment haven’t
come to bear.”59
Similarly, even after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the most sweeping
financial reform since the Great Depression,60 and one of its predecessor
statutes—the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”)61—financial
reporting lapses and bribery continued. The cosmetics company Avon
settled FCPA charges in 2014 for $135 million (one of the largest fines
collected from a U.S. company); the company estimates that it spent an
additional $300 million on its own internal investigation.62 That same year,
the Chinese government fined GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) $491.5 million
for bribing Chinese physicians and healthcare organizations, the largest
corporate fine ever levied by Chinese authorities.63 Mark Reilly, the head
of GSK’s Chinese operations, pleaded guilty to bribery and was deported.64
Glaxo called the “illegal activities” of GSK China Investment Co. “a clear
breach of GSK’s governance and compliance procedures” and said they
“are wholly contrary to the values and standards expected from GSK
employees.”65 Glaxo issued an apology in both Chinese and English “to

57. Hanna, supra note 53.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Brady Dennis, Obama Ushers in New Financial Era, WASH. POST, July 22,
2010, at A13 (discussing the significance of Dodd-Frank).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977).
62. Phil Wahba, Avon Settles Justice Department Charges of China Bribery for $135
Million, FORTUNE (Dec. 17, 2014, 6:02 PM EST), http://fortune.com/2014/12/17/avonbribery-probe-settlement/ [perma.cc/26FZ-9RTM]. In August 2015, Avon sought court
approval of a $62 million private settlement arising out of the same bribery allegations.
Avon Seeks Approval in U.S. of $62 ml Accord over China Bribery, REUTERS (Aug. 18,
2015,
12:55pm
EDT),
http://www.reuters.com/article/avon-corruption-settlementidUSL1N10T1B720150818.
63. Hester Plumridge & Laurie Burkitt, GlaxoSmithKline Found Guilty of Bribery in
China,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Sept.
19,
2014,
2:15
p.m.
ET),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/glaxosmithkline-found-guilty-of-bribery-in-china-1411114817
[perma.cc/4EE6-8YYN].
64. Id.
65. Id.
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the Chinese patients, doctors and hospitals and to the Chinese government
and the Chinese people.”66
All of these companies had general counsel. So, once again, as Judge
(and former head of the Enforcement Division at the Securities and
Exchange Commission) Stanley Sporkin famously asked, “Where were the
lawyers?”67 To that we add, “Where were the managers?”
We believe that an examination of the historical underpinnings of the
corporate environment in which counsel and managers currently find
themselves provides an insightful lens through which to examine the
persistent failure of major firms in the United States, Europe, and Asia to
comply with the law. We submit that legislation and regulatory action
alone are, and will continue to be, insufficient to deter corporate
misconduct of the sort we have experienced in the last two decades.
Instead, more attention should be paid to internal forces within firms. In
particular, we argue that the shift in general counsel’s role from “cop” to
“entrepreneur” has made it more difficult for general counsel to fulfill their
special duties as officers of the court and as corporate conscience. In
addition, the elimination of required MBA courses in business law in many
business schools has left future business leaders ill-equipped to manage the
legal and ethical aspects of business. As discussed in Part V, the resultant
lack of “legal literacy”68 has been compounded by the mantra of
shareholder primacy taught in many economics and finance classes.69
In this Article, we assert that counsel and managers can be more

66. Id.
67. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990)
(noting that while there were “literally scores of accountants and lawyers” in a case
involving the savings and loan scandal, Judge Sporkin wrote: “Where were these
professionals . . . ? Why didn’t any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the
transactions? Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these
transactions were effectuated?”); Egon Guttman & Stanley Sporkin, The Evolving Legal and
Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 52 AM. U. L.
REV. 639, 641 (2003) (paraphrasing Judge Sporkin’s question as, “Where were the
lawyers?”).
68. Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 378 (2008).
69. See generally LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012)
(debunking the myth that corporate law requires shareholder primacy); Constance E.
Bagley, Shareholder Primacy Is a Choice Not a Legal Mandate in 1 THE ACCOUNTABLE
CORPORATION 85-105 (Marc J. Epstein & Kirk O. Hanson, eds., 2005) (discussing duties of
directors to the corporation and shareholders in further detail); Constance E. Bagley &
Karen Page, The Devil Made Me Do It: Replacing Corporate Directors’ Veil of Secrecy
with the Mantle of Stewardship, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 897 (1999) (arguing that the nature
of the corporate form as well as an exclusive focus on shareholder value leads to
economically and socially inefficient results).
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effective drivers of both compliant corporate behavior and the creation of
sustainable value when they work together as strategic partners. This
requires both managers and counsel to accept responsibility for ensuring
that the firm’s economic success is predicated on integrity, honesty, and
compliance with not just the letter of the law but its spirit and societal
norms as well. Legally astute top management teams (“TMTs”) embrace
their responsibilities as guardians of the firm’s financial, human, legal, and
ethical capital. They understand that just as war is too important to leave to
the generals,70 so legal matters are too important to leave to the lawyers.71
Instead, as we discuss in Part IV, they practice “strategic compliance
management.”72
In Part I, we provide a brief history of the changing role of general
counsel in the United States, then in Part II we discuss four of the five
components of legal and strategic astuteness: (1) a set of value-laden
attitudes; (2) a proactive approach; (3) the exercise of informed judgment;
and (4) context-specific knowledge regarding the use of the law and legal
and managerial tools to increase realizable value, marshal and redeploy
resources, and manage risk. We address the fifth element, partnership with
strategically astute legal counsel (and, in the case of counsel, legally astute
managers),73 in Part III. In Part IV, we explain how legally astute top
management teams advised by strategically astute lawyers can increase
firm value by (1) using formal contracts as complements to relational
governance to reduce transaction costs and strengthen relationships, (2)
using legal tools, such as intellectual property rights, to protect, leverage,
and transform the realizable value of knowledge assets and other firm
resources, (3) creating valuable options, (4) practicing “strategic
compliance management,”74 and (5) helping change and shape the legal and
regulatory environment.75 Part V discusses how changes in the legal
component of the courses required in various management programs,

70. Attributed to either French Prince Charles Maurice de Talleyrand or French Prime
Minister Georges Clemenceau. See ERIC VON DER LUFT, GOD, EVIL, AND ETHICS: A PRIMER
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 7 (2004) (discussing the attribution of the quote).
71. CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, WINNING LEGALLY: HOW TO USE THE LAW TO CREATE
VALUE, MARSHAL RESOURCES, AND MANAGE RISK 5 (2005).
72. Id. at 50-86.
73. See generally Constance E. Bagley & Mark Roellig, The Transformation of General
Counsel: Setting the Strategic Legal Agenda, in LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT, GOVERNANCE
AND COMPLIANCE (Stuart Weinstein & Charles Wild eds. 2013) (discussing the role of
general counsel); Constance E. Bagley, The Value of a Legally Astute Top Management
Team: A Dynamic Capabilities Approach, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES
(David Teece ed., forthcoming) (discussing the value of a legally astute management team).
74. BAGLEY, supra note 71.
75. Id.
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especially those leading to a Master in Business Administration (“MBA”),
and the continued focus on the ill-conceived notion that the law requires
“shareholder primacy,” adversely affects business leaders’ ability to win
with integrity. We also discuss the steps the main accrediting body
AACSB International has taken to address that deficit, and we offer
suggestions for training more strategically astute lawyers. Part VI
describes the evolving role of in-house counsel outside the United States,
discussing changes in the rules governing lawyers in the United Kingdom
and presenting new data on the role of in-house lawyers in Sweden. We
argue that our prescriptions for heightened legal and strategic astuteness are
appropriate for firms based outside the United States as lawyers in other
countries become more entrepreneurial.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CHANGING ROLE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL IN THE UNITED STATES

The role of general counsel within large American corporations has
evolved considerably from the late nineteenth century to the present,
undergoing both falls and rises in their power and prominence. Unlike its
mid-twentieth-century embodiment, the modern position is one of great
prestige.
A. Period of Prestige: Post-Civil War through 1930s
Prior to the 1930s, general counsel enjoyed a golden age of power and
prominence, and corporate legal positions were highly desirable.76 General
counsel served both legal and business functions, and “their sage counsel
was regularly sought” by corporate management.77 The position’s high
remuneration levels reflected this high status: counsel received roughly
65% of the Chief Executive Officer’s salary, and they were often among a
corporation’s three highest paid executives.78 It was common at this time
for companies to groom a member of their legal department to become
CEO. Indeed, more than 75% of corporate CEOs in America had a legal
background during this period,79 as businesses recognized the added value a
legal education (and the analytical tools associated with that education)

76. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 490 (3d ed. 2005)
(detailing the history of general counsels).
77. Carl D. Liggio, Sr., A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel: Back to the Future—
—Or Is It the Past?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 621 (2002).
78. Id.
79. Edwin C. Mruk, Address to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
Committee on Corporate Law Departments (Nov. 1977).
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offered to their business concerns.80
B. Period of Decline: 1940s through Mid-1960s
The 1940s onward, however, saw a steady decline in the power and
prominence of the general counsel position due to the rise of Master of
Business Administration degree holders, the new “wunderkinds of the
business community.”81 American corporations increasingly favored
business over legal education as the preferred background for senior
management. Accordingly, companies’ hiring and promotion trends
shifted in favor of MBA graduates as the cohort from which companies
would choose their top leadership.82
Further compounding the decline of general counsel during this period
was the growth of outside law firms serving corporations’ increasingly
complex legal needs.83 With the ascendancy of MBAs came a corollary
decline in corporate America’s esteem for inside counsel, which resulted in
a diminished dependence on that counsel.84 General counsel’s income
declined accordingly to about 30% of the CEO’s by the mid-1970s, causing
top lawyers to avoid, rather than vie for, corporate counsel positions.85
General counsel devolved into a “relatively minor management figure,
stereotypically, a lawyer from the corporation’s principal outside law firm
who had not quite made the grade as partner.”86 In-house lawyers managed
“corporate housekeeping” matters, and they acted as a liaison to, and not
manager of, the outside legal firm.87
C. Period of Renaissance: Mid-1960s through 1980s
Beginning roughly in the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, a confluence
of factors spawned the rise of general counsel in both power and

80. See Carl D. Liggio, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: The Role of the General
Counsel: Perspective: The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201,
1201-02 (1997) (discussing the added value of a legal education for CEOs).
81. Liggio, supra note 77, at 621.
82. See Liggio, supra note 80, at 1202 (“Suddenly, marketers and financial types
became the new ‘wunderkinds;’ this corporate focus was then reflected in the hiring trends
of businesses. It is from this group that senior management was now selected.”).
83. Debora A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
955, 958-59 (2005).
84. Liggio, supra note 80, at 1202.
85. Id.
86. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm,
37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 277 (1985).
87. Id.
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prominence. First, an unprecedented growth in federal business regulations
presented corporations with increasingly complex legal compliance
issues,88 which, in turn, led to increased corporate demand for and
dependence on outside legal services.89 These regulations included Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,90 the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969,91 the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,92 the Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970,93 the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974,94 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.95 Second,
increased regulation prompted a corollary increase in the already high legal
fees corporations paid to outside law firms.96 Magnifying this effect was
the ballooning volume of business litigation generally characteristic of this
period.97
What ensued was a resurgence of inside counsel’s former power and
prominence.98 As outside legal firms became more powerful, the high costs
88. Liggio, supra note 80, at 1203-04.
89. Larry E. Ribstein, Symposium: The Changing Role and Nature of In-House and
General Counsel: Delawyering the Corporation, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 305, 308 (2012).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
94. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C., 18. U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977).
96. DeMott, supra note 83, at 960; Liggio, supra note 80, at 1204:
In 1963, the starting salary at a Wall Street law firm salaries [sic] was $7,200,
less than what the law firms then paid a good, experienced secretary. Billing
rates for new attorneys at the premier firms started at a mere $17 per hour, and
partner rates started at $45 an hour. This stands in stark contrast to today’s
costs in the New York legal market. Today, starting salaries of $90,000, over
twice what a good, experienced secretary is paid, are not uncommon; billing
rates for new associates average $115 an hour, and partner billing rates average
almost $450 an hour.
By 2015, starting salaries for 85% of new associates at firms with more than 250 lawyers in
New York City were $160,000; partner rates in New York City averaged $772 an hour in
2014. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, First-Year Associate Salaries at Large
Law Firms Have Become Less Homogenous, Though $160,000 Continues to Define the Top
of the Market (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/PressReleases/
2015ASSRPressRelease.pdf [perma.cc/647C-VFC7]; Jeffrey A. Lowe Esq., 2014 Partner
Compensation Survey, MAJOR, LINDSEY & AFRICA 48, http:/www.mlaglobal.com/~/media/
Allegis/MLAGlobal/Files/Partner%20Compensation%20Survey/2014/PCS_2014_Web_
091214_FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/LXX2-MKVG] (last visited Dec. 28, 2015).
97. See Liggio, supra note 80, at 1203 (noting that businesses “were now using the
legal process as one more tool in the business planning process”).
98. See id. (“Businesses, which previously had used only retained counsel, began to
create or enlarge their own legal staffs. Those businesses that did not have legal staffs
began to increase the quality and number of in-house lawyers.”).
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associated with switching to another firm resulted in corporate overreliance
on one firm.99 Because many elite law firms were not able or willing to
adjust their fee structures, companies sought cheaper alternatives to outside
counsel.100
Rather than be bound to one, uncompromising firm,
corporations began to procure a series of outside firms that then competed
for aspects of the company’s business.101 Often, the general counsel
oversaw this bidding process. This arrangement reduced the role of outside
counsel to a commodity and disincentivized firms from developing
company-specific knowledge about their corporate clients, thereby
eliminating a tradition of close relationships between firms’ partners and
corporations’ senior management. Companies that once exclusively
retained outside counsel began to establish or expand their in-house legal
departments using quality lawyers102 ultimately substituting outside counsel
with inside counsel.103
As John Coffee explained, the general counsel
became as much a general manager of legal services as an actual
counselor to management. For his or her own self-interested
reasons, the general counsel typically did not want competition
from outside counsel. He or she wanted to be the primary
conduit of legal advice to management and hence sought to
discourage any long-term, continuing relationship between senior
management and outside counsel. As much from this reason as
to encourage price competition, the in-house counsel moved legal
business around, thereby assuring his or her own monopolistic
position as the supplier of legal advice to senior management.
What shifted then was not the relative number of insider versus
outside counsel, but the balance of power between them.104
Reflecting this shift, the American Corporate Counsel Association
(“ACCA”) was established in 1980105 “to create a new identity for the
lawyers formerly known as ‘house counsel,’”106 who, by the 1980s,
99. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 915 (1990) (“If these functions are performed by outside
counsel, then market power, measured by the switching costs created, accrues to outside
counsel.”).
100. Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 505 (1989).
101. Ribstein, supra note 89, at 310.
102. Liggio, supra note 80, at 1203.
103. Rosen, supra note 100, at 505.
104. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 224 (2006).
105. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 86, at 277 n.1.
106. David B. Wilkinsal, Is the In-House Counsel Movement Going Global? A
Preliminary Assessment of the Role of Internal Counsel in Emerging Economies, 2012 WIS.
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performed an increasingly diverse set of nuanced roles.107 Robert Rosen
dubbed the restoration of the power and prominence of general counsel the
“age of enlightenment.”108
D. Prestige at the Cost of Integrity?: 1980s to 2002
Some argue that counsel’s rise to prominence begat a proportionate
decline in their professional and personal integrity. In 2000, Nelson and
Nielsen published a study reporting that modern general counsel in the
United States increasingly exhibited qualities of “entrepreneurialism,”
whereby “corporate counsel . . . adapt[ed] their images and lawyering
styles to the prerogatives of contemporary management.”109 One of three
lawyer archetypes (the others being “cop” and “counsel”), the
entrepreneurial lawyer “evolve[s] according to the needs of business,”
viewing law as a source of profits to be leveraged in the corporation’s
business strategy.110 In contrast, the “cop” role is primarily concerned with
“policing the conduct” of “business clients,” and “interact[ing] with
business people almost exclusively through legal gatekeeping functions,
such as approving contracts, imposing and implementing compliance
programs, and responding to legal questions.”111 The third role of
“counsel” “implies a broader relationship with business actors that affords
counsel an opportunity to make suggestions based on business, ethical, and
situational concerns.”112 (Our data on the roles played by in-house lawyers
in Sweden are set forth in Part VI.)
Unfortunately, as discussed in Part V, during this same period and

L. REV. 251, 277 (2012). Reflecting the increasing global nature of legal practice, the
association dropped “American” from its name in 2003. Assoc. of Corp. Counsel, History
and Heritage, ACC, http://www.acc.com/aboutacc/history/index.cfm [perma.cc/F44BYAZ3] (last visited Jan. 10, 2016).
107. “They managed and reviewed the legal services provided to corporate clients by
outside counsel; they regularly supplied routine legal services and, on some occasions,
directly handled complex transactions and even litigation; they counseled clients and their
constituents on regulatory requirements; and they created compliance programs.” Mary C.
Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization:
The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1061-62 (1997).
108. Rosen, supra note 100, at 488 (“No longer lacking resolution and courage, inside
counsel exercise their own powers with advice from, but not at the direction of, outside
counsel.”).
109. Robert Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457,
457 (2000).
110. Id. at 466.
111. Id. at 463.
112. Id. at 464.
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thereafter, many of the top business schools responded to the deregulation
of a number of industries, such as airlines, by eliminating the core business
law courses in their MBA programs, leaving future business leaders illequipped to work effectively with their newly empowered and arguably
more easily coopted counsel to manage the legal, ethical, and financial
aspects of business.113 In addition, as discussed further in Part V, the
doctrine of shareholder primacy taught in many programs overstated the
duty of directors to maximize shareholder value. The law governing the
fiduciary duties of directors has evolved over time. As discussed further in
Part V, except in extraordinary cases,114 shareholder primacy is a
managerial choice not a legal mandate.115
The increased entrepreneurialism that Nelson and Nielsen found
among U.S. general counsel in the 1990s is not surprising given the nature
of that period, which was “characterized by the dot-com boom and highflying markets involving mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and initial
public offerings (IPOs).”116 During this period, general counsel were
“prototypical Wall Street or Silicon Valley M&A lawyers who had prior
experience at the table with investment bankers.”117 Legal compliance was
not necessarily their forte. Instead, the focus shifted to getting the deal
done.
General counsel of this era continued to increase in professional and
social stature and served as trusted confidants to the CEO and other
members of senior management. This arrangement, however, raised
concerns about the independence of general counsel and the risks of
cooption: would counsel’s personal interests and their relationships with
senior management interfere with their ability to fulfill their fiduciary and

113. See Nitin Nohria & Rakesh Khurana, Advancing Leadership Theory and Practice in
HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (Nitin Nohria & Rakesh Khurana eds.,
2010) (asking if educational institutions are to blame for poor leaders); see also Where Will
They Lead? 2008: MBA Student Attitudes About Business and Society, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
(2008),
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/SAS_PRINT_
FINAL.PDF [perma.cc/H4MZ-AV33] (last visited Dec.. 28, 2015) (noting that only a
minority of M.B.A. students believed that business schools sufficiently addressed the ethical
aspects of successful leadership); infra text accompanying notes 336-372 (discussing
importance of legal training for business students).
114. These include when the break-up of the corporation or a sale of control has become
inevitable. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (“The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a
corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’
benefit.”).
115. Bagley, supra note 69.
116. June Eichbaum, Globalization and General Counsel, DIVERSITY & THE BAR
MAGAZINE, Aug. 2008, at 48.
117. Id.
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professional obligations to the corporation as officers of the corporation
and of the court?118 Joseph Auerbach’s answer to the question of whether
inside counsel can wear two hats was an unequivocal “no.”119
In 1993, Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman warned that “the
[American legal] profession now stands in danger of losing its soul.”120 His
remedy is the lawyer-statesman ideal, the demise of which Kronman
laments as a product of “the explosive growth of the country’s leading law
firms, which has changed forever the practice of the lawyers in them and
created a new, more openly commercial culture in which the lawyerstatesman ideal has only a marginal place.”121 This is not an entirely new
phenomenon. As early as 1905, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
warned that “lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to become
adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected the obligation to use their
powers as for the protection of people.”122
The increasing entrepreneurial tendencies among general counsel and
the concomitant deficits in the legal and ethical training of future managers
were symptomatic of the major corporate scandals that followed. As more
general counsel kowtowed to the prerogatives of senior management, they
“limit[ed] their gatekeeping functions . . . [by] defer[ring] to management’s
judgments about legal risk,”123 giving undue “priority to business objectives
rather than legal [imperatives].”124 Evidencing this danger are the stock
options backdating scandals at Monster Worldwide Incorporated, McAfee
Incorporated, and Brocade Communication Systems Incorporated, which
led to criminal convictions of responsible managers, including general
118. See, e.g., Joseph Auerbach, Can Inside Counsel Wear Two Hats?, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 80 (asking if in-house lawyers forfeit objectivity by taking part in
corporate planning). Of course, even outside counsel are susceptible to client capture. See
Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, Client Capture and the Professional Service Firm, 45 AM.
BUS. L.J. 685, 688 (2008) (explaining that capture occurs when “clients become so
important to the professionals serving them that they lose the professional independence that
is presumed by the profession to govern the relationship”). For example, even though Enron
was the largest corporate client in Vinson & Elkins’ Houston office, and Vinson & Elkins
had created the special purpose entities challenged by an Enron whistleblower, the Enron
audit committee relied on Vinson & Elkins to provide a legal assessment of the charges.
Robert A. Oppel Jr. & Kurt Eichewald, Arthur Andersen Fires an Executive for Enron
Orders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at A2. This is a bit like asking teenagers to grade their
own papers.
119. Auerbach, supra note 118.
120. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION xiv (1993).
121. Id. at 4.
122. James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2395, 2406 (2003) (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 337 (1914)).
123. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 109.
124. Id.

ARTICLE 4_BAGLEY 2-17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

WHO LET THE LAWYERS OUT?

2/17/16 7:39 PM

439

counsel, for accounting fraud.125
Counsel had become overly
“comfortable” in their roles, causing them to, according to Donald
Langevoort, “too readily [engage in] a process of collective rationalization”
whereby “objectivity . . . [or] ‘cognitive independence’ [] is predictably
diminished” and unethical legal risks are irrationally assumed.126 Indeed,
more than 30% of firms “subject to civil or criminal investigations for
illegal accounting of backdated stock options fired their general
counsel.”127
The end of the M&A/Hot IPO era was replete with corporate scandals,
most notably those that led to the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, but
also those involving Arthur Andersen, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems,
Google, Symbol Technologies, Rite Aid, Inso, Warnaco, Computer
Associates International, Gemstar-TV Guide, and Tyco.128 As noted
earlier, the flagrant disregard for the law by multiple companies across
diverse industries prompted Judge Sporkin to ask, “Where were the
lawyers?”129
E. SOX Enforcement Era: 2002 through 2008
These scandals incited public outrage, prompting a new era of sterner
federal regulation of business, most notably in the form of the SarbanesOxley Act (“SOX”) of 2002.130 In an effort to ensure that lawyers
protected public investors by acting more as gatekeepers (or “cops”) than,
perhaps, as “entrepreneurs,” Congress placed unprecedented scrutiny on
the role and responsibilities of inside counsel, “essentially deputiz[ing] a
public corporation’s CLO [Chief Legal Officer] as a gatekeeper of . . .

125. Grant McCool, US Judge Sentences Ex-Monster Counsel to Probation, REUTERS
(Mar.
2,
2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/monsterworldwide-counselidUSN0218689420100302. A variety of companies issued employee stock options at an
exercise price that was lower than the fair market value on the date the options were actually
granted by backdating the grant to an earlier date when the market value was lower.
Granting “in-the-money” options triggers a charge against earnings equal to the difference
between the fair market value on the day of grant and the exercise price. Firms that
backdated option grants committed accounting fraud when they failed to report this
compensation expense. Catherine Fredenburgh, What’s the Big Deal About Backdating
Stock
Options?,
LAW360
(June
15,
2006,
12:00
AM
ET),
http://www.law360.com/articles/7017/what-s-the-big-deal-about-backdating-stock-options
[perma.cc/6DGA-TDZ2].
126. Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-house Lawyers, Enterprise
Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 496 (2012).
127. Bagley & Roellig, supra note 73.
128. Kim, supra note 55, at 985.
129. Guttman & Sporkin, supra note 67.
130. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq. (2003).
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national securities markets.”131 These external changes impelled internal
ones.
For example, Section 307 of SOX requires in-house counsel to report
up the ladder material violations of law to the chief legal counsel or chief
executive officer; if such individuals do not “appropriately respond,” the
attorney must report the violation to the audit committee of the board of
directors.132
Section 307 also authorizes the attorney to disclose
confidential information without the issuer’s consent to the SEC in certain
circumstances.133 Congress had faulted Enron’s in-house counsel and
outside lawyers for “displaying a lack of objective professional advice and
oversight”134 after they failed to report the accounting fraud perpetrated by
Enron’s senior management to the SEC.135 MassMutual Financial now
annually sends a letter to all its outside counsel attaching its reporting-up
policy and making it very clear that outside counsel are expected to report
to the general counsel any issue they see where a company’s lawyers or its
other employees are violating the law. It further instructs outside counsel
to report any such activity to the CEO and ultimately to the board if the
general counsel or the CEO are involved.
Corporations responded to these stricter federal regulations by
recruiting a new kind of general counsel, triggering a fundamental shift in
the evolution of the position’s function. The professional profile of general
counsel shifted away from experience on Wall Street and in Silicon Valley
to experience in Washington, D.C. and on Capitol Hill.136 Having, for
example, an “ex-regulator or former federal prosecutor as the company’s
chief lawyer, it was reasoned, would neutralize potential enforcement
issues before crises erupted.”137 Corporations “required a general counsel

131. Kim, supra note 55.
132. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b); Ahmed & Farkas, supra note 46, at 866-67.
133. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2); Ahmed & Farkas, supra note 46, at 866-67.
134. James L. Sonne, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307: A Progress Report on How Law
Firms and Corporate Legal Departments Are Implementing SEC Attorney Conduct Rules,
23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 859, 859 (2010).
135. Ahmed & Farkas, supra note 46, at 863.
136. Eichbaum, supra note 116, at 48.
137. Id. (including notable examples: “Steve Cutler, Gary Lynch, and Dick Walker, all
former Directors of Enforcement of the SEC, [who] became general counsel of JPMorgan
Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Deutsche Bank, respectively. David Aufhauser and Neal
Wolin, both former general counsel at the Treasury Department, re-entered the private
sector as general counsel of Hartford Financial Services and UBS. Former Justice officials
Larry Thompson, Jim Comey, Jonathan Schwartz, Beth Wilkinson, and Ivan Fong became
general counsel of PepsiCo, Lockheed Martin, Cablevision, Fannie Mae, and Cardinal
Health. Other general counsel of major U.S. corporations who have significant prior
experience with federal agencies include Larry Tu, Dell, Inc. (State Department); Paula
Boggs, Starbucks (Army); and Judith Miller, Bechtel (Defense Department).”).
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who could proactively identify and defuse risk, and who knew how U.S.
regulators thought and what they cared about.”138 Counsel needed to
understand and comply with new regulations and to prevent unethical
corporate behavior.
These evolutionary shifts restored some of inside counsel’s original,
intended integrity and concern with the public good, but they by no means
sparked the full transformation139 the profession needed, as evidenced by
the ensuing subprime mortgage crisis and other scandals.
F. The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Massive Product Recalls Land
Counsel and their Clients Back in the Drink: 2008 to the Present
Triggering what some economists have dubbed the worst financial
crisis since the Great Depression,140 leading banks knowingly sold billions
of dollars of faulty subprime mortgages and mortgage-backed securities in
the early aughts. This resulted in a series of criminal and civil actions
against the responsible companies following highly publicized
congressional investigations, federal administrative actions, and joint
multistate-federal actions.
In reference to Citigroup’s leveraged lending practices, Charles O.
Prince III, former general counsel and then CEO of Citigroup, quipped in
July 2007, “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be
complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and
dance. We’re still dancing.”141 Months later, Citigroup had to write down
its leveraged loan portfolio by $1.5 billion.142
Even the storied multinational investment firm Goldman Sachs did not
escape unscathed. In 2010, it agreed to pay $550 million to the SEC—the
largest settlement ever collected by the SEC from a Wall Street firm—to
settle charges that Goldman committed securities fraud when it sold
138. Id.
139. See Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 1, 12-13
(2008) (identifying five “pathways of corporate legal strategy”: (1) avoidance, (2)
compliance, (3) prevention, (4) advantage and (5) transformation); see also Robert C. Bird
& David Orozco, Finding the Right Corporate Legal Strategy, 56 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV.
81, 82 (2014) (“The five, in order of least to greatest strategic impact, are: (1) avoidance, (2)
compliance, (3) prevention, (4) value and (5) transformation.”).
140. David Pendery, Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since
Great Depression; Risks Increase if Right Steps Are Not Taken, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2009,
10:22am
EST),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/27/idUS193520+27-Feb2009+BW20090227 [perma.cc/E6LU-K5ZR].
141. Cyrus Sanati, Prince Finally Explains his Dancing Comment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8,
2010, 2:04 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/prince-finally-explains-hisdancing-comment/?_r=0 [perma.cc/K66S-YGL3].
142. Id.
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derivative contracts based on subprime mortgages without disclosing that
another Goldman client, who had taken a short position in the subprime
market, had helped select the mortgage-backed securities on which the
derivatives were based.143 Goldman also allegedly spread negative rumors
about the Greek sovereign debt market while simultaneously serving as an
adviser to the Greek government.144
Conduct by Goldman and other investment banks involved in the
meltdown of the subprime mortgage market that began in 2008 contributed
to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).145 In 2012, forty-nine state
attorneys general and the attorney general of the District of Columbia
partnered with the federal government in reaching a $25 billion settlement
with the five largest U.S. mortgage lenders—Bank of America, Ally Bank
(formerly GMAC), JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Citicorp—for their
bad faith dealings with investors.146 Bank of America agreed in August
2014 to pay $17 billion to settle similar allegations from the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in what is the largest settlement ever
reached between the U.S. government and a single company.147
Approximately equivalent to the Bank’s total profit over the past three
years, the $17 billion settlement still represents only a fraction of the
staggering total $80 billion the bank has spent on legal battles stemming
from the financial crisis.148 In total since the crisis, the SEC has collected

143. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550
Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm [perma.cc/74XT-824X]. The complaint
is
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf
[perma.cc/P54H-VKD3]. See also Sewell Chan & Louise Story, Goldman Pays $550
Million to Settle Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at B1 (“Goldman Sachs has agreed
to pay $550 million to settle federal claims that it misled investors in a subprime mortgage
product . . . .”).
144. See Joseph Stiglitz, The Fraught Road to World Financial Reform, INDEP. FIN. REV.
(NZ), June 10, 2010 (“That Goldman Sachs executive saw himself as doing ‘God’s work’ as
his firm sold short products it created, or disseminated scurrilous rumors about a country
where it was serving as an ‘advisor,’ suggests a parallel universe, with different mores and
values.”).
145. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
780).
146. Daniel Fisher, Here’s What’s in the $25 Billion Mortgage Settlement, FORBES (Feb.
9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/02/09/states-feds-to-announce-25billion-mortgage-settlement/ [perma.cc/WDK3-2ZQG].
147. Christina Rexrode & Devlin Barrett, Bank of America to Pay $17 Billion in Justice
Department Settlement, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/bank-ofamerica-reaches-17-billion-settlement-1408560100 [perma.cc/MZ5Z-2H5Z].
148. See id. (“Bank of America has spent more than $60 billion on legal woes stemming
from the financial crisis, and the latest settlement would push the tab to close to $80
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more than $3.64 billion in penalties, disgorgement, and other monetary
relief from responsible companies on behalf of wronged public investors.149
This is in addition to the $115 billion in legal fees U.S. banks have paid
relating to the financial crisis.150
Persistent wrongdoing has not been confined to the financial sector.
In 2007, Mattel had to recall 2 million toys with unsafe levels of leadtainted paint. Notwithstanding a renewed focus on public safety reflected
in tougher product safety laws promulgated in 2008,151 Mattel continued to
sell lead-tainted toys.152
The “new” General Motors that emerged from bankruptcy was
clobbered by accusations that it had ignored potentially fatal safety issues
related to its ignition switches for more than a decade. Since February
2014, General Motors has recalled 2.6 million vehicles due to faulty
ignition systems linked to at least 124 deaths and almost 400 injuries, and it
has paid $595 million to the victims and their families.153 General Motors
failed to issue vehicle recalls during the staggering ten-year period the
automaker knew of the defects.154 This not only “threaten[ed] to undermine

billion.”).
149. See generally U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC Enforcement Actions
Addressing Misconduct That Led to or Arose From the Financial Crisis,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml [perma.cc/48Z6-B2JJ] (summarizing all
of the money the SEC has collected from responsible companies).
150. See A Strong Start to the Earnings Season, CASEY DAILY DISPATCH (July 17, 2015),
https://www.caseyresearch.com/articles/a-strong-start-to-earnings-season [perma.cc/L4P3XMY9] (containing a figure that represents fees paid through September 2014).
151. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat.
3016 (2008). Among other things, the act banned lead levels above a certain amount and
banned phthalates in children’s products.
152. Press Release, Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, Mattel, Fisher-Price to Pay $2.3
Million Civil Penalty for Violating Federal Lead Paint Ban, Penalty is Highest Ever for
CPSC
Regulated
Product
Violations
(June
5,
2009),
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/News-Releases/2009/Mattel-Fisher-Price-to-Pay-23Million-Civil-Penalty-for-Violating-Federal-Lead-Paint-Ban-Penalty-is-highest-ever-forCPSC-regulated-product-violations/ [perma.cc/Y29M-PSY8] (“The penalty settlement,
which has been provisionally accepted by the Commission, resolves CPSC staff allegations
that Mattel and Fisher Price knowingly (as defined in the Consumer Protection Safety Act)
imported and sold children’s toys with paints or other surface coatings that contained lead
levels that violated a 30-year-old federal law.”).
153. See Bill Vlasic, G.M. Chief Is Named Chairwoman, Affirming Her Leadership, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/business/gm-chief-is-namedchairwoman-affirming-her-leadership.html [perma.cc/J4J6-KJFH] (“[T]he company
admitted to selling millions of small cars with defective ignition switches that were later tied
to at least 124 deaths”).
154. See Jerry Hirsch, Embattled General Motors General Counsel Millikin To Retire,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014, 11:08 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-gmlawyer-millikin-retires-20141017-story.html [perma.cc/GG3S-JWGH] (“The automaker
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the company’s reputation for quality,”155 it also impeached its integrity.
Michael Millikin, who became general counsel of General Motors in 2009
and retired in July 2015, denied knowledge of the ignition-switch problems
even though other lawyers in his department were aware of them and had
settled cases with confidentiality agreements to keep problems hidden.156
Plaintiffs have subpoenaed General Motors’ chief outside counsel King and
Spaulding to determine “who knew what, when.”157 At a minimum,
Millikin had failed to create a culture in which his in-house and external
attorneys knew they were expected to report up to him any material legal or
safety issues.158 Mary Barra, who took over as General Motors’ CEO in
January 2014, repeatedly apologized for “putting lives at risk in the
company’s cars” and “fir[ed] employees responsible for the decade-long
delay in fixing the problem.”159 In September 2015, General Motors agreed
to pay a $900 million criminal penalty to settle U.S. Department claims
related to the defects.160 Barra reportedly told employees at a town hall
meeting in the fall of 2015 that General Motors “still had work to do to
knew about the problem for at least a decade but waited until this year to start recalling the
cars.”).
155. Bill Vlasic & Danielle Ivory, In Recall Blitz, G.M. Risks Its Reputation, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/business/gm-announces-vastexpansion-of-its-recalls.html [perma.cc/F36B-TD9P].
156. Hirsch, supra note 154.
157. General Motors and King & Spalding have been accused of conspiring to commit
fraud and “conceal a known safety defect by quietly settling death and injury cases rather
than instituting a recall.” Sue Reisinger, GM Plaintiffs Try Crime-Fraud Exception to Get
Documents,
CORP.
COUNSEL
(June
15,
2015),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202729304577/GM-Plaintiffs-Try-CrimeFraudException-to-Get-Documents [perma.cc/7F4F-9WT9]. Various documents have been
subpoenaed but not produced as of June 2015. Id.
158. “‘Whether general ‘culture’ issues are to blame is difficult, but the story of the
Cobalt is one in which GM personnel failed to raise significant issues to key decision
makers. Senior attorneys did not elevate the issue within the Legal chain of command to the
General Counsel even after receiving the [redacted] evaluation in the summer of 2013 that
warned of the risk of punitive damages because of a ‘compelling[]’ argument that GM had
‘essentially . . . done nothing to correct the problem for the last nine years.’” ANTON R.
VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY REGARDING
IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS 1, 253 (May 29, 2014). Report is available on the NHTSA
website at www.nhtsa.gov (enter “Valukas Report” in search box, then follow “[PDF]
Valukas report on General Motors – Home National Highway . . .” hyperlink.
159. Vlasic, supra note 153.
160. Nathan Bomey & Kevin McCoy, GM Agrees to $900M Criminal Settlement Over
Ignition-Switch Defect, USA TODAY (Sept. 17, 2015, 6:37 p.m. EDT),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2015/09/17/gm-justice-department-ignitionswitch-defect-settlement/32545959/ [perma.cc/CUQ6-HZGL]. The Justice Department
indicated that individual employees could still be charged. Id. As of September 2015,
General Motors had incurred more than $2 billion in fines and penalties related to the faulty
switches, exclusive of the cost to repair the recalled vehicles. Id.
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restore its reputation for quality and safety,”161 stating, “Apologies and
accountability don’t amount to much if you don’t change your behavior.”162
One analyst attributed her promotion to the additional rank of chair in
January 2016 in part to how General Motors responded to her “initiatives to
overhaul its culture after the ignition scandal.”163 The costly overhaul
would not have been necessary had both General Motors’ lawyers and its
managers accepted responsibility for ensuring the safety of the company’s
products and acted promptly to address defects as soon as they became
known instead of using confidential settlement agreements to hide them.
Similarly, by 2016, Japanese airbag manufacturer Takata had recalled
almost 20 million vehicles due to faulty airbags, which can explode when
deployed.164 The defects have resulted in at least eight deaths in the United
States and more than one hundred serious injuries.165 Takata may have to
recall millions more airbags unless it can prove that the propellant it uses is
safe.166 A highly critical report published by the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation in 2015 attributed Takata’s delayed
response to the defects in part to cost-saving measures,167 a charge Takata
denied.168 The Committee also found the same types of failures of
communication between the manufacturer’s home office in Japan and
operations in the United States (and Mexico, in the case of Takata)169 as
contributed to Toyota’s tardy response to complaints by Americans of
“unintended acceleration.”170 The New York Times reported that Takata
had manipulated airbag test results since at least 2000.171 The Times also

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Vlasic, supra note 153.
164. See Danielle Ivory & Hiroko Tabuchi, Takata Emails Show Brash Exchanges about
Data Tampering, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/business/
takata-emails-show-brash-exchanges-about-data-tampering.html [perma.cc/4WDT-GM2V]
(detailing the recall).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANSP., supra note 23, at 15 (noting that
engineers in the Monclova, Mexico plant had identified quality issues as far back as 2001).
168. See Hiroko Tabuchi & Danielle Ivory, Takata is Said to Have Stopped Safety Audits
as a Cost-Saving Move, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/
23/business/takata-is-said-to-have-stopped-safety-audits-as-cost-saving-move.html
[perma.cc/5LPF-VA83] (reporting on Takata’s response).
169. See COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANSP., supra note 23, at 15 (noting that
engineers in the Monclova, Mexico plant had identified quality issues as far back as 2001).
170. See A ROAD FORWARD: THE REPORT OF THE TOYOTA NORTH AMERICAN QUALITY
ADVISORY PANEL, 1, 4 (May 2011), http://www.safetyresearch.net/Library/Toyota_Quality_
Report.pdf [perma.cc/4G5Y-M6VP] (discussing the internal issues that led to the delayed
Toyota recall of more than five million Toyota vehicles).
171. See Ivory & Tabuchi, supra note 164 (“Takata’s practice of manipulating airbag test
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quoted a January 2005 memo from Bob Schubert, a Takata airbag engineer,
in which he told a colleague that he (Schubert) had been “repeatedly
exposed to the Japanese practice of altering data presented to the
customer.”172 Citing Takata’s alleged manipulation of safety testing data,
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration imposed a $70 million
fine in November 2015.173 On that same day, Honda Motor Company,
which had been Takata’s largest customer, dropped Takata as its airbag
supplier, stating that Takata had “misrepresented and manipulated” its
airbag testing data.174
In July 2015 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
fined Fiat Chrysler Automobiles $105 million for failing to fix problems in
more than 11 million vehicles involved in 23 recalls since 2013.175 In the
consent order, Fiat Chrysler admitted it had “failed to fix problems in three
recalls and was slow or inadequate in notifying consumers and regulators
of defects, including faulty ignition switches, suspension parts and fuel
tanks.”176
One must ask, “What is going on here? Have companies accepted the
payment of fines and damages as just a cost of doing business?” In the late
1970s and early 1980s, Ford Motor Company became a poster child for
trading dollars for human lives and injuries when it failed to recall the Ford
Pinto, which had a fuel tank that could explode if the vehicle were rearended at speeds as low as twenty miles per hour.177 In an infamous memo,
Ford engineers had calculated that it would cost Ford about $137.5 million
to recall and fix the defective vehicles, but only about $49.6 million to
compensate victims injured or killed by the exploding gas tanks.178
Rejecting Ford’s calculus, the jury awarded $2.5 million in compensatory
damages and $125 million in punitive damages to punish Ford for its
reprehensible conduct and deter other manufacturers from doing something
similar.179 Such a high multiple of punitive to compensatory damages may
results dates to at least 2000, just as the company began to introduce a new type of
inflater.”).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Amanda Bronstad, Plaintiffs Lawyers Plan Their Moves after Fiat Chrysler Fine,
NAT’L
L.J.
(July
29,
2015),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/home/id=
1202733451629?slreturn=20150630103105[perma.cc/D92W-NJYF].
176. Id.
177. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360 (Ct. App. 1981).
178. W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547,
569-70 (2000). Design changes to enhance the integrity of the fuel tank system ranged from
about $2.00 per car to $10.00 per car. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
179. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358. The punitive award was later reduced to $3.5
million as a condition of denying Ford’s motion for a new trial. Id. at 358-59.
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no longer be permitted since the U.S. Supreme Court held that “in practice,
few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”180
We argue that in cases where a firm has knowingly engaged in unlawful
conduct that endangered human health or safety that cap should not be
imposed. Otherwise, managers are more likely to ignore their lawyers’
advice and seek to justify their misconduct as “economically rational,”
given the chances of being caught and the likely monetary damages and
fines. In any event, as discussed in Part V.D., such a calculus is shortsighted and underestimates the true cost of noncompliance.
The airline industry has been tainted by conflict-of-interest charges.
In September 2015, Jeff Smisek, the CEO of United Airlines, resigned
following an investigation into his relationship with David Samson, the
then chair of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which
oversees the airport in Newark, New Jersey. United had begun flying a
non-stop route (generally only about half full) between the Newark airport
and a South Carolina airport about fifty miles from the Port Authority
chair’s weekend home at a time when United was working with the Port
Authority to reduce the price of a new aircraft hangar United was building
in Newark.181 United cancelled the flights after Samson resigned. Smisek,
a graduate of Harvard Law School, received more than $4.8 million in
severance and may receive a bonus payout as well.182 In this case, we ask,
“Where were the directors?”
Clearly the federalization of corporate governance in SOX, DoddFrank and related laws and regulations and the promulgation of tougher
product safety standards have not had their intended effect of deterring
corporate wrongdoing on a massive scale. Rather than looking outside the
firm for more external attempts to require corporate compliance, we
encourage firms and policy makers to look inward, at the role of both chief
legal officers and managers in ensuring that firms create long-term value
by operating with integrity.
Looking inward is especially important in light of the DOJ’s recent
prioritization of prosecuting responsible individual employees of a
corporation, regardless of their rank, rather than simply the corporation

180. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
181. See Shawn Boburg, United CEO Quits Over Internal Probe of Airline’s
Relationship with Port Authority Ex-Chairman, NORTHJERSEY (Sept. 8, 2015, 5:16 PM),
http://www.northjersey.com/news/united-ceo-quits-over-internal-probe-of-airline-srelationship-with-port-authority-ex-chairman-1.1405658?page=all [perma.cc/AJ5B-4Z7T]
(discussing the chair’s use of company airplanes to fly to his summer home).
182. Id.
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itself.183 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations
adopted by the U.S. Sentencing Commission,184 the maintenance of a
meaningful voluntary compliance program is a mitigating factor that
reduces the otherwise applicable fine.185 Unfortunately, certain companies
have engaged in scapegoating, whereby lower-level employees are blamed
for corporate wrongdoing while more senior managers, who were complicit
or tacitly condoned behavior in violation of the company’s compliance
program, went scot free.186 On September 10, 2015, Deputy Attorney
General Sally Quillian Yates announced that:
The rules have just changed. Effective today, if a company wants
any consideration for its cooperation, it must give up
the individuals, no matter where they sit within the company.
And we’re not going to let corporations plead ignorance. If they
don’t know who is responsible, they will need to find out. If they
want any cooperation credit, they will need to investigate and
identify the responsible parties, then provide all non-privileged
evidence implicating those individuals.187

183. See Amie Tsang, Morning Agenda: Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street
Executives
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
10,
2015),
http://news.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/morning-agenda-justice-department-sets-sightson-wall-street-executives/?_r=0 [perma.cc/84CH-8YTA] (“After years of criticism that it
has coddled Wall Street criminals, the Justice Department has prioritized the prosecution of
individual employees and not just their companies . . . .”).
184. Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
& 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998). It is an independent agency in the judicial branch charged with
establishing a fair and more uniform federal sentencing system for both individuals and
organizations. Id. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations went into effect in
1991. Ethics & Compliance Initiative, FSGO: Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations at 20 Years, http://www.ethics.org/?q=page/fsgo-federal-sentencingguidelines-organizations-20-yearshttp [perma.cc/3VAN-RH9G] (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
They are “designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their agents, taken
together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations
to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting and reporting criminal conduct.”
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §3E1.1 (Nov. 2013).
185. See id. at 502 (“The prior diligence of an organization in seeking to detect and
prevent criminal conduct has a direct bearing on the appropriate penalties and probation
terms for the organization if it is convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense.”).
186. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of
Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 658-60 (2002) (warning that scapegoating can result in “selfdeception, denial of responsibility, and lack of repentance” as well as the “purchase” of the
trappings of compliance just to impress regulators).
187. Dep’t of Justice, Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates Delivers Remarks at
New York University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual Liability in
Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 10, 2015); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Memorandum for the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, et al. on Individual
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LEGAL AND STRATEGIC ASTUTENESS

Legal astuteness is the baseline level of legal literacy that enables nonlawyer managers to effectively communicate with lawyers regarding the
legal and ethical issues that increasingly affect business success or
failure.188 Without legal astuteness, the common moral discourse between
lawyers and non-lawyers, if any, is inadequate, making it more likely that
counsel will indeed need to forfeit their seat at the senior executive table to
preserve the independent integrity of their office.
Legal astuteness is a valuable dynamic capability189 and may be a
source of sustained competitive advantage under the resource-based view
of the firm.190 Legal astuteness:
requires (1) a set of value-laden attitudes about the importance of
law and ethical behavior to firm success, (2) a proactive approach
to regulation and risk, (3) the ability to exercise informed
judgment when managing the legal and business aspects of the
firm, and (4) context-specific knowledge of the law and the
appropriate use of legal tools.191
Moreover, a TMT cannot be legally astute without strategically astute
lawyers.192 Strategic astuteness:
requires (1) a set of value-laden attitudes; (2) a proactive
approach to business opportunities and threats, including not just
regulatory and legal risk but also market and competitive
challenges, risks, and opportunities; (3) informed judgment; [and]
(4) context-specific knowledge of management, business, the
law, and the appropriate use of both managerial and legal tools.193

Accountability
for
Corporate
Wrongdoing
(Sept.
9,
2015),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [perma.cc/2PK7-WEDH] (detailing the
steps involved in investigating corporate misconduct).
188. Bagley, supra note 68.
189. Bagley, supra note 73. The dynamic capabilities approach explains how certain
firms create competitive advantage in a “Schumpeterian world of innovation-based
competition, price/performance rivalry, increasing returns, and the ‘creative destruction’ of
existing competencies.” David J. Teece, Gary Pisano & Amy Shuen, Dynamic Capabilities
and Strategic Management, 18 STRAT. MGMT. J. 509, 509 (1997) (internal citation omitted)
(quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934)).
190. See Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Integrating Law and
Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 592 (2010) (legal astuteness is “the ability of managers to
communicate effectively with counsel and to work together to solve complex problems and
leverage the resource advantages of the firm . . . .”).
191. Bagley, supra note 73, at 8.
192. See Bagley & Roellig, supra note 73, at 45-66.
193. BAGLEY, supra note 71.
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A. Value-Laden Attitudes
Legal and strategic astuteness require a set of value-laden attitudes
about the importance of law and ethical behavior to economic success. As
Jim Metcalf, then President of USG Corporation stated, “It’s important to
remember who you are and where you’re from. Then you fight like hell to
be good stewards.”194 It is essential for the leadership of a firm to establish
and enforce explicit and implicit expectations for all employees, beginning
with senior executives. Especially with respect to corporate values,
“management communicates as much by what it doesn’t do or say as by
what it says and does. In fact, behavioral forms of communication are apt
to have more credibility than spoken or written forms.”195 Accordingly, it
is not enough for corporations simply to state their corporate values; their
leaders must practice them and hold accountable those who fail to act in
accordance with them. As former General Electric General Counsel
Benjamin Heineman explains:
The stirring call for performance with integrity at the large
company meeting can be eroded by the cynical comment an
executive makes at a smaller meeting, by the winks and nods that
implicitly sanction improprieties, by personal actions
(dishonesty, lack of candor) that contradicts [sic] company
values.196
“Creative compliance,” defined by Terrell as “complying with the
letter of the law but defeating its spirit and purpose,”197 as well as
capitalizing on unintended legal loopholes,198 rub against the grain of the
legally astute culture. Even if an action is not inherently unlawful, it may
make subsequent unlawful action more likely to occur.
These value-laden attitudes include an understanding of the
intertwined nature of business and ethical interests; as already noted,
“business decisions consist of continuous, interrelated economic and moral

194. Constance E. Bagley & Eliot Sherman, USG Corporation (C), Harvard Business
School Case No. 807-121, at 8 (2007).
195. PHILIP T. DROTNING, Organizing the Company for Social Action, in THE UNSTABLE
GROUND: CORPORATE SOCIAL POLICY IN A DYNAMIC SOCIETY 260 (S. Prakash Sethi ed.,
1974).
196. Benjamin Heineman, Jr., Avoiding Integrity Landmines, 85 HARV. BUS. REV. 100,
102 (2007).
197. Timothy P. Terrell, Professionalism on an International Scale: The Lex Mundi
Project to Identify the Fundamental Shared Values of Law Practice, 23 EMORY L. REV. 469,
536 (2009).
198. See Daniel T. Ostas, Legal Loopholes and Underenforced Laws: Examining the
Ethical Dimensions of Corporate Legal Strategy, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 487, 487 (2009)
(discussing legal loopholes and underenforced laws).

ARTICLE 4_BAGLEY 2-17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

WHO LET THE LAWYERS OUT?

2/17/16 7:39 PM

451

components.”199 When these interests appear to conflict, counsel and
business leaders “should keep trying to reframe issues and refine tactics
until they are satisfied that the firm’s legitimate business objective of
‘winning’ in the marketplace is being advanced in an effective, legal, and
above board manner.”200 Managers must consider not only what the firm
can do but also what it should do.201 Former CEO of Johnson & Johnson
(“J&J”) Ralph Larson captured this sentiment when he responded to the
question of whether he wanted J&J to maximize shareholder value or be a
good corporate citizen by answering, “Yes.’”202 He rejected what he
termed “the tyranny of the ‘or’.”203 When asked which qualities were most
important for successful leaders, Berkshire Hathaway’s Warren Buffet
responded, “‘Integrity, intelligence and energy. Without the first, the other
two will kill you.’”204
Victor Tettmar, the managing partner of Bond Pearce, called general
counsel the “guardian of moral capital.”205 We argue that general counsel
must be “a” guardian of moral capital who empowers the top management
team to share that responsibility. Both counsel and managers can better
protect that capital when they embrace the idea that “the moral aspects of
choice” are the “final component of strategy.”206
B. Proactive Approach
An intrinsically valuable practice,207 taking a proactive approach
toward business and legal issues is a hallmark of legally astute top
management teams: “Business corporations do not have legal problems.
They have business problems where legal considerations may be more or

199. Diane L. Swanson, Addressing a Theoretical Problem in Reorienting the Corporate
Social Performance Model, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 43, 51 (1995).
200. Bagley & Roellig, supra note 73.
201. C. ROLAND CHRISTENSEN ET AL., BUSINESS POLICY: TEXT AND CASES 121 (6th ed.
1987).
202. Bagley & Page, supra note 69, at 913.
203. Id.
204. See Ibolya Balog, Ethics on their Shoulders: Boards Bear the Burden, ACCT.
TODAY (Nov. 27, 2006), http://www.accountingtoday.com/ato_issues/2006_21/226031.html [perma.cc/PZ23-6XYH] (Buffett took over as head of investment bank Salomon
Brothers after its illegal rigging of Treasury auctions almost destroyed the venerable bank.
He gave employees his home phone number in Omaha, Nebraska, and asked them to call
him directly if they observed any improper behavior); see also MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S
POKER (1989) (telling the story of the author’s four years at a Wall Street investment firm).
205. Rebecca Lowe, Compliant Counsel, 8(2) IN-HOUSE PERSPECTIVE 13, 14 (2012).
206. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 201, at 578.
207. See generally Teece et al., supra note 189 (discussing how firms achieve and
sustain competitive advantage).
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less important, depending on the specific circumstances.”208
Business leaders who view the “law purely as a constraint, something
to comply with and react to rather than to use proactively, will miss
opportunities to use the law and the legal system to sense and seize
opportunities and thereby increase the firm’s realizable value.”209
Additionally, they will lose the value strategically astute lawyers provide
the firm.210 Instead, legally astute business leaders acknowledge inside
counsel’s “right and responsibility to insist upon early legal involvement in
major transactions.”211 Failing to do so prevents counsel from actively
participating in the creation and capture of firm value. “[T]he later a
lawyer is brought into the planning of a transaction, the more likely it is
that the lawyer will have to say ‘no.’ Anticipating this, business managers
may provide counsel with a skewed set of facts in hopes of improving the
likelihood of receiving the go-ahead.”212
Jonathan Anschell, General Counsel at CBS Television, recounted the
difficulty of finding lawyers who do not walk into every meeting on a new
venture saying, “‘Are you sure you want to do this? It’s very risky.’”213
“‘What they don’t seem to understand,’ Anschell said, ‘is that we have no
choice but to move forward. These markets are fluid, they’re changing all
the time and we can’t afford to be hanging back waiting for the
uncertainties to shake out. What we need are lawyers who know how to
think about how to manage risk, not avoid it.’”214
C. Exercise of Informed Judgment
Managing risk and being able to sense and seize opportunities require
the exercise of informed judgment:
Law is not an exact science—legal rules are not applied
formulaically. Seemingly minor changes in facts can result in
dramatically different legal outcomes. Often, there is no clear
precedent to serve as a guide. Dealing effectively with the
uncertainties inherent in many decisions having legal aspects

208. MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 20 (1980).
209. BAGLEY, supra note 71.
210. Bagley & Roellig, supra note 73.
211. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 86, at 281.
212. Constance E. Bagley & Mark Roellig, General Counsel: Strategic Partners or
Hired Guns?, in EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, COMPANY LAWYERS:
INDEPENDENT BY DESIGN at 115 (Philippe Coen & Christophe Roquilly eds., 2014),
http://www.ecla.org/files/files/Profession/document1.pdf [perma.cc/QBQ2-MAQ7].
213. Quoted in Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 I/S J.
L. POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 4 (2012).
214. Id.
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requires the exercise of informed judgment. Legally astute
managers—even those with formal legal training—do not purport
to advise themselves on legal matters of importance. They
appreciate the importance of selecting a true counselor at law
who combines knowledge of the black-letter law with judgment
and wisdom. As Yale Law School Dean Anthony T. Kronman
(1995) explained, wisdom is more than technical skill; it is the
capacity to offer deliberative advice—that is, to go beyond
merely supplying whatever means are needed to achieve the
client’s goals and to deliberate with the client about the wisdom
of the client’s ends.215
“Certain courses of action may be legal but not wise.”216
We define good judgment in the corporate setting as the ability to
make effective, productive decisions and to take actions in
multidimensional settings that are aligned with the legitimate business
objectives. It requires the decision maker and advisor to identify what is
important for all constituencies and to think through all the implications of
the proposed action as well as the consequences of not acting. The
participants need to gather the appropriate information to understand the
issue at hand and decide whether external input is necessary for an
informed decision, recognizing that the time and cost of obtaining further
information may outweigh the benefits. Thus, one should not call meetings
just for the sake of having a meeting.
It is important to listen to, evaluate and integrate often conflicting
views from diverse participants before taking action. Integration requires
the identification of trends, patterns, problems, and opportunities and the
ability to make connections between what may at first appear to be
different or unrelated issues or facts. The participants need to critically
evaluate the goals, obstacles, likely responses, and proportionality of risks,
costs, and benefits of the proposed course of action. This includes deciding
what weight to put on the possibilities/potential outcomes and facts. It also
requires knowing what is ethically and societally right and wrong, what is
acceptable and what is not.
The participants must avoid acting on impulse but work together to
ensure that the proposed action or advice is timely, balancing the degree of
uncertainty and ambiguity as well as the magnitude of the risk and the
opportunity. It is also important to make sure that the proposed action will
actually solve the issue and not just “kick the can down the road.” It is also
critical to ensure that the proposed solution can be efficiently implemented
in a timely, cost-effective, and ethical manner. The participants should
215. Bagley, supra note 68, at 381 (citing KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 132-33).
216. Id. at 381.
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strive to keep self-interest and recognition out of the equation: the right,
difficult-to-sell solution is a bigger personal and corporate win than the
easy, short-term personal gain. Finally, it is critical to know when and to
whom to escalate a decision.
We posit that it may not be possible to teach good judgment, but it
certainly is possible to practice exercising it. In the class “Introduction to
In-House Practice of Law,” taught by co-author Roellig at the University of
Colorado Law School,217 Roellig uses business-school type case studies
based on real fact patterns to tee up the discussions.218 The lead author has
worked with in-house counsel in firms as diverse as MassMutual,
Microsoft, CVS Health, and Prudential to design and present in-house
training programs utilizing customized case studies that require the
participants to practice exercising good judgment.
D. Context-Specific Knowledge of the Law and Business and the
Application of Legal and Managerial Tools
As already noted, legal astuteness is the baseline level of legal literacy
necessary for non-lawyer managers to effectively communicate with
lawyers on the legal issues that increasingly affect business objectives.219
Legal literacy includes context-specific knowledge of the law and the
appropriate application of legal tools.220 Similarly, strategically astute
lawyers must be business savvy, familiar with at least the basics of
accounting, corporate finance, negotiation, business planning, and
competitive strategy. One manager complained:
Our lawyers just don’t know what we do, how a business like this
works. There’s a massive DNA gap. I want lawyers who will
come spend time here, getting to know how this business works,
what we need and what we don’t. I have a hard time getting
outside counsel to take up my offer.221
The trust that managers and lawyers foster by regularly working
together as a team is a firm-specific relationship222 that “cannot be readily

217. See
Course
Descriptions,
COLORADO
LAW,
http://lawweb.colorado.edu/courses/courses.jsp?show=EK&sortBy=TITLE
[perma.cc/RXD5-5GGT] (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (Colorado Law offering “Introduction
to In-House Practice of Law” to its students).
218. This course is discussed further in Part VI.
219. Bagley, supra note 68.
220. Id.
221. Hadfield, supra note 213, at 4.
222. Jay B. Barney & Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive
Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175 (1994).
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recreated when a lawyer or manager leaves to join another firm.”223 This
teamwork also enhances the firm’s “ability to sense the need to reconfigure
the firm’s asset structure and to accomplish the necessary internal and
external transformation.”224 For example:
[I]n what Warren Buffett called “the most successful managerial
performance in bankruptcy I’ve ever seen,” USG Corporation,
manufacturer of Sheetrock® wall board and other building
materials, successfully shed its asbestos liability pursuant to an
orchestrated strategy that combined (1) filing for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11 so it could obtain a “channelling injunction,”
whereby the plaintiffs suing for asbestos-related disease would be
required to seek redress solely from a dedicated trust funded by
USG and approved by 75 percent of the claimants; (2) lobbying
for federal legislation to create a multi-firm fund for the payment
of asbestos personal injury claims in accordance with accepted
medical standards for determining the existence and severity of
asbestos-related disease; (3) litigating dubious claims; (4) a
human resource strategy that valued both factory workers and upand-coming managers; (5) transparency with both investors and
employees; (6) a reputation for reliability and honest dealing with
suppliers, customers, and employees; and (7) the ability to shift
resources from primarily manufacturing Sheetrock® and its other
building materials to distributing other firms’ products as well.
USG emerged from bankruptcy five years after filing with a
channelling injunction in effect pursuant to a reorganization plan
that was approved by 98% of the asbestos claimants and a
shareholder committee led by Warren Buffett, whose holding
company Berkshire Hathaway owned about 15 percent of USG’s
stock and back-stopped a $1 billion rights offering, with all debts
paid in full with default interest, shareholder equity intact, and
more than a 50 percent increase in revenues. Although USG
CEO Bill Foote conducted this “orchestration” and played a
critical role lobbying for changes in the law, USG’s success
would not have been possible but for his own personal
knowledge of law and legal tools, and his close relationship with
GC [General Counsel] Stan Ferguson and other in-house lawyers
along with the outside lawyers who helped litigate the asbestos
claims and advised on the bankruptcy proceedings.225

223. Bagley, supra note 68.
224. Teece et al., supra note 189, at 520.
225. BAGLEY, supra note 71 (citations omitted).
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Partnership of Legally Astute Managers with Strategically Astute
Lawyers

Managers cannot be legally astute unless they are advised by
strategically astute lawyers who understand their business. Similarly, it is
very difficult, if not impossible, for a lawyer to be strategically astute
unless his or her client is legally astute. Otherwise, the communication
barriers will most likely prevent effective collaboration.
Strategically astute counsel and legally astute managers form what
Kim Clark and Steve Wheelwright call “heavyweight teams,” comprising
managers and in-house lawyers.226 Unlike representatives governed by
Graham Allison’s notion of “where you stand depends on where you sit,”227
members of heavyweight teams do not just represent their functional group.
Instead, they act as general managers with responsibilities for the success
of the entire project. PepsiCo CEO Indra Nooyi echoed this sentiment
when she explained that “we can’t afford this separation of church and
state,”228 whereby lawyers are satisfied with drafting perfect documentation
for a flawed deal.
Strategically astute counsel help the managers craft the firm’s value
proposition and define the activities in the value chain, keeping legal and
ethical as well as business imperatives “top of mind.” Both strategically
astute lawyers and legally astute managers recognize that business success
and ethical and legal behavior complement, rather than oppose, each other.
Rather than viewing the law as a constraint, legally astute top management
teams use the law and legal and managerial tools to increase realizable
value, marshal resources, and manage risk— both legal and business.
III.

GENERAL COUNSEL AS STRATEGIC PARTNER NOT HIRED GUN
OR COP

Although many of the entrepreneurial tendencies revealed by Nelson
and Nielsen undoubtedly contributed to systemic corporate malfeasance at
Enron, WorldCom, and other former high flyers, and major legal lapses at
Bank of America, Citicorp, General Motors, and Barclays, we do not

226. Kim B. Clark & Steven C. Wheelwright, Organizing and Leading “Heavyweight”
Development Teams, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1992, 9, 9.
227. See generally, GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 307, 325-47 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining that the recommendations of
key decision makers involved in the Cuban missile crisis were highly correlated with their
functional responsibilities, with, for example, the Secretary of Defense recommending a
military response and the Secretary of State recommending negotiation).
228. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 380.
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believe that a degree of entrepreneurialism in general counsel is per se bad,
just as we do not believe that solely being the cop is per se good. Effective
counsel do not presume to act fully independently of their business
partners. If they did, then they would quickly become irrelevant, as
managers conclude that it is indeed “better to ask forgiveness than
permission.” Instead, strategically astute counsel exercise informed
judgment in the course of helping drive business success and take
professional pride in avoiding the potential pitfalls of becoming too
“comfortable,” engaging in a “process of collective rationalization,” or
potentially assuming improper, irrational risk.229 We submit that general
counsel should be both an active participant in the creation and capture of
firm value as well as a trusted counselor—what we call the “strategic
partner.”
However, while the strategic partner engages in
entrepreneurialism, he or she does so in a crucially different way from
Nelson and Nielsen’s entrepreneurial lawyer. Unlike the entrepreneurial
lawyer, who kowtows to the prerogatives of the top management team, a
strategically astute counsel never engages in entrepreneurialism at the
expense of his or her overriding professional duty and responsibility to the
owners of the enterprise and the legal system to promote compliance with
both the letter and the spirit of the law.
To say that general counsel should entirely eschew entrepreneurialism
is an extreme that amounts to a “fetishization” of entrepreneurialism in the
same way certain scholars have arguably overemphasized independence
concerns of general counsel in the wake of massive corporate
malfeasance—what Usha Rodrigues coined the “fetishization” of
independence.230
Fetishization “transform[s] an essentially negative
quality—[here] lack of ties to the corporation—into an end in itself.”231 It
is a shortsightedness to ignore, Simmons and Dinnage argue, the real value
general counsel can generate by using these ties to the corporation, which
may even outweigh the “risk and probabilities associated with conflicts.”232
The strategic partner recognizes that business pursuits must satisfy the
firm’s financial, legal, and ethical obligations. Put another way, the
strategic partner continually refocuses business issues toward a
consideration of means together with their ends, asking not only whether
the ends are achievable but also whether the ends themselves are right.
This approach is based on Dean Kronman’s lawyer-statesman ideal: true
counselors “deliberate, for and with their clients, about the wisdom of their
229. Langevoort, supra note 126, at 496.
230. Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 447 (2008).
231. Id.
232. Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the
In-House Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 91-92 (2011).
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clients’ ends, as opposed simply to supplying them with the legal means for
realizing their desires.”233 “A lawyer whose only responsibility is to
prepare the way for ends that others have already set can never be anything
but a deferential servant.”234 The lawyer-statesman acts “as a kind of buffer
between the illegitimate desires of his client and the social interest.”235
Such an individual “represents [both] the client before the legal system,” as
well as the “legal system to the client.”236
Yet, is the lawyer-statesman’s ethical burden too heavy for counsel to
bear when they are also expected to serve on a corporation’s top
management team (“TMT”)? IBM general counsel Robert Weber believes
so, calling it an untenable “millstone” that requires counsel to forfeit their
seat at the senior executive table.237 We respectfully disagree. General
counsel can and should be both a senior executive and a corporate
conscience, but counsel cannot be the sole corporate conscience.238 If
counsel are, they will likely forfeit their seat at the senior executive table,
as Weber predicts. This is because the other senior executives may not be
willing to do what it takes to ensure that legality and ethics are not
sacrificed at the altar of short-term profits, a risk that is exacerbated when
executive compensation is tied to stock performance without proper regard
for how the profits were generated.
Strategically astute counsel will therefore work with the other
members of the TMT to establish a culture wherein all employees, but
especially senior executives, recognize that meeting legal and ethical
expectations is essential to enduring business success. The general counsel
is, as a result, able to uphold a high ethical standard without fear of losing a
seat at the senior executive table because he or she is but one in a collection

233. KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 133; see also Deborah Hussey Freeland, Recovering
the Lost Lawyer, 2014 AM. BAR ASS’N J. PROF. LAW. 1 (2014) (discussing the disappointing
reality that lawyers are striving to become task-proficient rather than developing the skills
for intellectual and affective deliberation).
234. KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 15.
235. Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 384 (rev. ed. 1954).
236. Robert Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255,
255 (1990).
237. Robert Weber, Is the GC the Conscience of the Company? Maybe Not; IBM’s
general counsel explains why in-house lawyers aren’t (and shouldn’t be) the conscience of
their
companies.,
CORP.
COUNSEL
(Jan.
24,
2013),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1358699364123/Is-the-GC-the-Conscience-of-theCompany-Maybe-Not? [perma.cc/6D8M-UWLF].
238. Benjamin Heineman, Jr., General Counsel Are One Conscience of the Company; A
Response to IBM’s Robert Weber, CORP. COUNSEL (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202585457251/General-Counsel-are-One-Conscience-ofthe-Company [perma.cc/HXK9-A9CU].
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of corporate consciences working in the C Suite.
Finally, to ensure that outside counsel obtain accurate and unbiased
information regarding legal matters raised by the business leaders or the inhouse lawyers, we believe that managers should be empowered to speak
directly with outside counsel, especially when the question at issue was
internally blessed by in-house counsel. In such a situation, the general
counsel and the responsible manager should ensure that the outside firm is
truly independent to avoid the type of cooption that occurred when the
audit committee at Enron asked outside counsel Vinson & Elkins to opine
on the legality of the very same special purpose entities that Vinson &
Elkins had helped create.239 In annual meetings with its key outside
counsel, the general counsel of MassMutual Financial makes clear the
expectations of its outside counsel to speak directly to the CEO, or the
board if appropriate, if they have concerns regarding the pursuit of a
particular business or legal approach.
Figures 1 and 2240 compare the reactive approach to legal issues
followed by many firms who bring in outside counsel on an episodic basis
with the type of ongoing communication that facilitates proactive advice
from not only in-house but also outside counsel. Although the general
counsel is usually responsible for managing legal spending and will, in
most cases, decide when to bring in outside counsel and will often be the
primary (if not, only) contact with outside counsel, if the in-house counsel
has participated in a decision being challenged, then the responsible
managers or board members should ensure that there is neither the reality
nor appearance of conflict of interest. For example, if the general counsel
has engineered the process by which an employee who subsequently claims
discrimination was terminated, the employee’s claims should be evaluated
by independent counsel empowered to discuss the matter with not only the
general counsel but also the managers involved. Otherwise, the enterprise
could be put at undue risk by an in-house lawyer attempting to bury his or
her own mistake. At MassMutual Financial, there have been occasions
where the general counsel has requested the CEO to receive advice or
confirmation directly from outside counsel, with no involvement by him,
when he was personally involved in the particular underlying decision
under review.

239. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 658 (S.D.
Tex. 2002) (finding that among the allegations against Vinson & Elkins, Enron’s outside
general counsel, in the Enron litigation was that “Vinson & Elkins provided advice in
structuring virtually every Enron off-balance sheet transaction and prepared the transaction
documents, including opinions, for deals involving . . . vehicles used to defraud investors
and the securities markets.”).
240. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 226.
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FIGURE 1: REACTIVE APPROACH TO LEGAL ISSUES

FIGURE 2: LEGALLY ASTUTE APPROACH TO LAW AND MANAGEMENT
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THE VALUE OF LEGAL ASTUTENESS

Legal astuteness is a valuable dynamic capability241 and may be a
source of sustained competitive advantage under the resource-based view
of the firm.242 Legal astuteness captures the strategic spirit of the
entrepreneurial lawyer shaped by the legal and ethical imperatives of the
lawyer-statesman ideal, ultimately optimizing the value counsel and, in
turn, the entire top management team, can add to the firm. Specifically,
legally astute top management teams can (1) use formal contracts as
complements to relational governance to reduce transaction costs243 and
strengthen relationships, (2) protect and enhance the realizable value of
knowledge assets and other firm resources, (3) use legal tools to create
valuable options, (4) practice “strategic compliance management”244 and
thereby both promote legal compliance and enhance the firm’s ability to
convert regulatory constraints into opportunities, and (5) help shape the
regulatory environment.245
A. Using Contracts to Strengthen Relationships
A famous study by Stewart Macaulay246 found that written contracts:
were often highly standardized documents that were largely
confined to the drawer once drafted by the legal department then
rarely consulted to resolve disputes. The parties’ obligations
were often adjusted without reference to the terms of the original
contract and breaches were resolved without litigation or
litigation threats. When problems arose, parties would find a
solution ‘as if there [had] never been any original contract’
(Macaulay 1963).247

241. The dynamic capabilities approach explains how certain firms create competitive
advantage in a “Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competition, price/performance
rivalry, increasing returns, and the ‘creative destruction’ of existing competencies.” Teece
et al., supra note 189, at 509.
242. Bagley, supra note 68.
243. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975).
244. BAGLEY, supra note 71.
245. Bagley, supra note 68; BAGLEY, supra note 71.
246. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relatives in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 64 (1963).
247. Iva Bozovic & Gillian K. Hadfield, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Build
Informal
Relations
to
Support
Innovation
(Feb.
25,
2015),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1055&context=ghadfield
[perma.cc/4Z94-EJRR].
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Kent Walker, General Counsel of Google, and others have “bemoaned
the difficulty of reducing the reams of wasted paper and effort in managing
the company’s contract relationships.”248
‘Never, in ten years,’ he [Walker] said, ‘has a dispute ever turned
on the precise language of a non-disclosure agreement. Yet we
still spend lots of time dickering about these things.’ In other
areas, Walker has tried to bring some rationality to the amount of
paper needed. ‘But I send them the two pages I think we need,
and they chuckle and send back ten or more.’ And how, he
wonders, can he give his legal teams the right incentives
in
contracting to recognize that sometimes too much legal
wrangling or risk-aversion leads to lost or less valuable deals?249
We submit that the solution for Walker’s problem with properly
incentivizing lawyers is having legally astute managers actively involved in
the negotiations and drafting of the contract. Although contracts are
negotiated and enforced “in the shadow of the law,”250 coupling long-form
contracts with trust-building reduces the likelihood that disputes will have
to be resolved via the court system.
Some contend that insisting on formal contracts, as opposed to taking
someone at their word, signals distrust and thereby encourages
opportunistic behavior.251 North and Weingast posit the opposite: contracts
and other institutional assets “do not substitute for reputation-building and
associated punishment strategies, but complement them.”252 The process of
contracting can help companies establish healthy, valuable business
relationships by building social ties between the parties and clarifying their

248. Hadfield, supra note 213, at 3.
249. Id. (quoting Kent Walker, the General Counsel at Google).
250. See Robert H. Mnookin & L. Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 997 (1979) (noting that “[i]ndividuals in a wide
variety of contexts [beyond family law] bargain in the shadow of the law” and that “the
preferences of the parties, the entitlements created by law, transaction costs, attitudes toward
risk, and strategic behavior will substantially affect the negotiated outcomes”).
251. Sumantra Ghoshal & Peter Moran, Bad Practice: A Critique of the Transaction
Cost Theory, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 13, 24-27 (1996); see also Macaulay, supra note 246, at
164 (discussing non-contractual relations and communication).
252. Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice of Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 803, 808 (1989) (emphasis added); see also Barry R. Weingast & William J.
Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are
Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988) (discussing why it can be beneficial
for legislatures non-market exchanges can be more beneficial than market exchanges); Paul
R. Milgrom, Douglas C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival
of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1
(1990) (explaining the importance of a good reputation in trade).
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respective objectives and expectations. Thus, formal contracts can
optimize the value of business relationships by reducing overall transaction
costs while increasing trust, decreasing ill-will, and actively deterring
opportunistic behavior from either party by assigning a guaranteed high
cost for engaging in such behavior. Conversely, especially when the
different parties’ interests are not naturally aligned, poorly drafted contracts
can destroy value.253
Thus, a company’s welfare hinges on how competently and creatively
that company’s lawyers can work with managers to add value to the firm
through the contract language they negotiate and draft. This is where the
in-house counsel’s knowledge of management and operations, as well as
the business of the company, is key. It allows the counsel to intelligently
see around corners to anticipate areas of risk and proactively structure
strategy or relationships to advance the business objectives. Thus,
creativity extends to foreseeing potential exchange hazards (particularly
those associated with specialized asset investments, uncertainty, and
difficult performance measurements) and preemptively resolving them by
either “defin[ing] remedies for foreseeable contingencies or [by]
specify[ing] processes for resolving unforeseeable outcomes.”254 It is also
important to note that outside counsel have in-depth knowledge and skills
that in-house counsel does not. Often they are experts in a particular area
of law, with a broad knowledge working with many clients in this area of
law. They also may become aware of trends that in-house counsel may not
see. Thus, it is the appropriate mix of the different expertise and
knowledge of in-house and outside counsel that provides the greatest
benefits to the organization.
A study by Bozovic and Hadfield found that “companies, large and
small, that described innovation-oriented external relationships reported
making extensive use of formal contracts to plan and manage these
relationships.”255 For example, the manager of an optics system firm
stated:
I don’t want to do business without a contract. . . . If you’re going
to invest in something, even if we are putting our time into it, I
have to understand who is going to own what and how it’s going

253. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428, 1430-32,
1435 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (stating in a lawsuit brought by Apple against Microsoft for violating
Apple’s copyrights for the Macintosh graphical user interface: “Had it been the parties’
intent to limit the [Apple] license to the Windows 1.0 interface, they would have known
how to say so.”).
254. Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance
Function as Substitutes or Complements?, 23 STRAT. MGMT. J. 707, 707 (2002).
255. Bozovic & Hadfield, supra note 247, at 1.
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to be . . . how the future rights are going to be handled. . . . I
mean if you’re just selling something, then I guess that means the
UCC applies. There’s a commercial code and you know, you
could imply the terms. But when you’re doing innovation and the
kind of stuff we do, often there’s no pattern for what you’re
doing before. So you need to have some kind of agreement.. [sic]
particularly if there’s a lot of money involved. I mean sometimes
these ideas like I said the one that was millions of dollars, we
have another one that we’ve generated 3 million dollars of
royalties on it, it’s all documented, there’s 3 [sic] amendments to
that agreement.256
Bozovic and Hadfield found, however, that managers of ‘innovationoriented external relationships’ “[d]o not . . . generate these formal
contracts in order to secure the benefits of a credible threat of formal
contract enforcement. Instead, like Macaulay’s original respondents, they
largely relied on relational tools such as termination and reputation to
induce compliance.257
We agree with Bozovic and Hadfield’s assertion that:
[F]ormal contracting—meaning the use of formal documents
together with the services of an institution of formal contract
reasoning—serves to coordinate beliefs about what constitutes a
breach of a highly ambiguous set of obligations. This
coordination supports implementation of strategies that induce
compliance—despite the presence of substantial ambiguity ex
ante at the time of contracting—with what is fundamentally still a
relational contract.258
This assertion is supported by a study by Poppo and Zenger of
outsourcing relationships in information services during the 1990s.259 They
found that relational governance and formal contracts did complement each
other. Their study revealed that using both contracts and trust-building
directly and indirectly increased exchange performance as measured by
satisfaction with the quality, cost, and responsiveness of the outsourced
service: “The presence of clearly articulated contractual terms, remedies,
and processes of dispute resolution as well as relational norms of
flexibility, solidarity, bilateralism, and continuance may inspire confidence
to cooperate in interorganizational exchanges.”260
Supporting the
importance of having counsel that is both competent and creative, Poppo

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 45.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Poppo & Zenger, supra note 254, at 707-25.
Id. at 712.
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and Zenger further found that increases in the level of relational
governance were associated with greater levels of contractual complexity,
and vice versa.261
Jim Wuthrich, the head of Warner Brothers’ home video division,
based his firm’s path-breaking deal with BitTorrent for the peer-to-peer
online distribution of its films and television shows not only on the contract
the lawyers negotiated but also on BitTorrent’s choice of leading filmindustry lawyer Clive Davis to represent BitTorrent.262 Davis helped
distinguish BitTorrent from Napster, which had decimated Warner
Brothers’ record business by making it easy for users to pirate copyrighted
music.263 Wuthrich also accepted his responsibility, as the manager in
charge of the deal, to work with the lawyers to address both the legal risk
of licensing Warner Brothers’ content and the business risk of not licensing
it.
B. Enhancing, Leveraging, and Transforming the Value of Knowledge
Assets and Other Firm Resources
Like the failure to institute proper corporate governance practices,264 a
company’s failure to implement proper legal tools to protect, leverage, and
transform its assets can prevent it from realizing the full value of those
assets. The law provides many intellectual property (“IP”) rights
businesses can utilize to protect and enhance its intellectual capital,
including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets (e.g., formulas,
processes, customer lists, and other information that gives a firm
competitive advantage by being kept secret).265 Companies can use
“patents, copyrights, and trade secrets to command premium prices, to
exact royalties, to reduce costs, and to erect barriers to entry,” and
trademarks to “help create and preserve brand equity.”266
Unlike many of its competitors who were unwilling to take the
litigation risk, EMC Corporation decided to acquire VMware, a pioneer in
x86 software virtualization technology, even though VMware was
embroiled in a patent infringement lawsuit with Microsoft at the time.267

261. Id. at 721.
262. Constance E. Bagley & Reed Martin, Warner Bros. and BitTorrent, Harv. Bus. Sch.
Case No. 807-012 (2006).
263. Id.
264. Barney & Hansen, supra note 222.
265. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 151.
266. Id.
267. Bagley et al., EMC Corp.: Proposed Acquisition of VMware, Harv. Bus. Sch. Case
No. 807-153 (2006).
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EMC’s CEO Joe Tucci and its GC Paul Dacier convinced that
[sic] board of directors that the benefits of the acquisition
outweighed the risks. This calculus was based in part on EMC’s
ability to use its own patents as bargaining chips, its own internal
expertise in litigating patent cases, its ability to limit its enterprise
risk by doing a reverse triangular merger so VMware would be a
separate subsidiary, and its relationship with Microsoft, which
was both a competitor and a partner. About a year after the
acquisition, Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer called Tucci
proposing that both sides dismiss their claims because ‘friends do
not sue friends.’ A company that EMC acquired in 2004 for
roughly $635 million had market capitalization of more than $43
billion on August 15, 2014. (EMC spun off 20 percent of
VMware’s shares in an initial public offering in 2007; as of
August 15, 2014, EMC’s 80 percent stake in VMware was worth
roughly $34 billion, [nearly 57%] of EMC’s total market
capitalization of $60 billion.) Had EMC been unable to
transform itself from primarily a commodity hardware
manufacturer into a data solution provider, it would not be
trading at its current multiple of roughly twenty-four times
earnings.268
There are three qualifying points: First, IP rights are rarely, if ever,
sufficient to create sustained competitive advantage on their own. As
Margaret Peteraf noted, “If the innovation is no more than a clever and
complex assembly of relatively available technologies, then no wall of
patents could keep opponents out.”269 Firms must therefore create an
“ongoing stream of innovation in response to both consumer need for
cheaper or more differentiated products or for what Apple co-founder Steve
Jobs was a genius at anticipating: products customers did not realize they
needed until they saw them.”270
Second, a firm should never use its resources to protect or establish its
IP rights at the expense of innovation itself:
Polaroid ultimately won its lawsuit against Kodak for
infringement of its patents on instant film and cameras, but did
the attendant management distraction . . . contribut[e] to
Polaroid’s (and Kodak’s) failure to appreciate the threats and
opportunities posed by digital photography? [Did] Apple’s
multi-year litigation against Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard for
copyright infringement . . . distract Apple from continuing to

268. Bagley, supra note 73, at 31-32 (citations omitted).
269. Margaret A. Peteraf, The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A ResourceBased View, 4 STRAT. MGMT. J. 179, 187 (1993).
270. Bagley, supra note 73, at 35.
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improve the Macintosh computer[?]271
As Polaroid learned the hard way, winning the court case against a key
competitor can be a pyrrhic victory if it distracts a firm from redeploying
resources to meet changing needs in the marketplace.272
Third, managers and their lawyers must avoid overly protecting a
firm’s IP rights when the business strategy requires giving users the right to
at least some degree of “unauthorized” copying. Gillian Hadfield provides
the following example. Consider, she postulated, what approach a lawyer
should take to drafting the terms of use for posting CBS Television content
online.273 “Surely the answer is to put out a set of terms that locks up
CBS’s ownership over its content?”274 CBS Television’s Executive Vice
President and General Counsel Jonathan Anschell responds, “Not so.”275
Instead, he argues:
We need lawyers who understand that in the world of new media
if you lock it down, you don’t get the kind of user-generated
content that is such an important component of the new media.
But when we tell lawyers that, they come back with the polar
opposite—a set of terms that is a user’s dream but a contentprovider’s nightmare. We need something in between these two
extremes, but we find it very hard to locate the providers who
know how to think about that.276
Lawyers need to not only understand the law, but also need to
understand in this innovative world, as information becomes digitized,
disruption of traditional businesses, information transfer and processes will
occur. This can lead to the demonetization of certain services and
products. Providing products and services widely and for free may at times
have greater value to the company and society than the natural legal
instinct to protect and limit access to them.
C. Creating Options
Legally astute managers recognize the inherent value of options and
will work with strategically astute lawyers to use the law to create them.277
An option is the right, but not the obligation, to defer a decision until a

271. Id. at 37-38.
272. Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
273. Hadfield, supra note 213, at 4.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. (quoting CBS’s General Counsel Anschell, explaining that locking it down is not
always the best decision).
277. Bagley, supra note 68, at 378-90.
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future date.278 Real options theory assigns inherent value to deferring
decisions of uncertainty to a later date.279 Such options include an option to
purchase real property or stock, the right to terminate a joint venture,
subjecting a founder’s shares to vesting,280 and securing coinvestment
rights in future venture capital rounds.281
D. Strategic Compliance Management
As recent corporate scandals evidence, a company’s failure to
effectively manage its legal compliance can result in high, negative
monetary returns for the firm in the form of criminal and civil penalties.282
And these large penalties represent only a portion of the noncomplying
firm’s total loss, with legal fees often exceeding the monetary penalties
imposed.283 Fraud alone can cost a typical company between one and six
percent of its annual sales revenues.284 As a result, the “ability to prevent
fraud, or value loss through fraud, has become a potential source of
competitive advantage and improved financial performance for firms in
today’s economy.”285 Conversely, illegal behavior can lead to the demise
of a firm, as happened with Drexel Burnham Lambert286 and Steve Cohen’s
hedge fund SAC Capital Advisors in the wake of massive insider trading
by their managers.287
Creating a law-abiding culture that does not diminish managers’
competitive drive is difficult but certainly not impossible. Legally astute

278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1981).
279. Bruce Kogut & Nalin Kulatilaka, Capabilities as Real Options, 12 ORG. SCI. 744758 (2001).
280. CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO
BUSINESS LAW 93-94 (4th ed. 2011).
281. Id. at 476.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 3-40 (discussing the penalties for corporate
malfeasance).
283. See, e.g., Brinded, supra notes 6 & 14 (demonstrating the extremely large penalties
and legal costs that companies are often forced to pay).
284. Karen Schnatterly, Increasing Firm Value Through Detection and Prevention of
White-Collar Crime, 24 STRAT. MGMT. J. 587, 587 (2003).
285. Id.
286. See, e.g., STEWART, supra note 44 (describing Drexel Burnham Lambert’s collapse
after unethical and illegal activities eventually led to bankruptcy).
287. Peter Lattman & Ben Protess, $1.2 Billion Fine for Hedge Fund SAC Capital in
Insider
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
4,
2013,
11:06
AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/sac-capital-agrees-to-plead-guilty-to-insidertrading/ [perma.cc/NUT7-YGFY]. Cohen was permitted to transfer his personal and family
assets to a successor firm Point72 Asset Management, but Point72 Asset Management
cannot manage outsider money and SAC Capital was forced to liquidate.
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TMTs practice “strategic compliance management.”288 There are ten steps:
1. Start with ethics and start at the top
2. Help shape the rules of the game
3. Look for opportunities to convert constraints into
opportunities
4. Understand duties and anticipate risks
5. Benchmark both accidents and violations and near-misses
6. Avoid conflicts of interest and fully disclose
7. Implement appropriate controls and processes
8. Compete hard but fairly
9. Educate all employees and distribute written policies
10. Be prepared to deal with compliance failures.289
The application of these ten steps is context-dependent, and each firm
should tailor its controls, policies, processes, and practices to the
noncompliance risks that are most pertinent to that firm.290 Because
compliance is not a case of one size fits all, replication of best practice may
be illusive.291 Still, independent directors should in every context “make it
clear to the general counsel (and to the CEO and other senior management)
that [they expect regular reports covering] . . . actual or potential material
violations of law, breaches of fiduciary duty, and other ‘substantial legal
concerns.’”292
Whistleblowers can be the canaries in the mine shaft, providing early
warning of imminent disaster.293 Too often they are ignored, isolated, and
shunned.294 Managers need to protect whistleblowers from retaliation by

288. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 50, 85-86.
289. See id. at 47-50 (setting forth a nine-step program).
290. See id. at 49-56 (providing a basis for management to create a compliance platform
and noting how “[s]uch a capability is path dependent . . . and is not a resource that can be
readily bought and sold”).
291. Teece et al., supra note 189, at 517.
292. William W. Horton, Serving Two (or More) Masters: Professional Responsibility
Challenges for Today’s In-House Healthcare Counsel, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 187, 194
(2010); see also American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Report
of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 59 BUS. LAW.
145, 161 (2003) (suggesting that directors work actively with general counsel on “oversight
responsibilities” and “legal compliance matters”).
293. CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 37 (8th ed. 2016) (“Like the birds taken into mines to detect deadly
gases, they often perceive dangers before top management.”).
294. Joel Chineson, Bureaucrats with Conscience, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 1989, at 50
(quoting a whistleblower who had warned of violations at a nuclear power plant: “Be
prepared for old friends to suddenly become distant. Be prepared to change your type of job
and lifestyle. Be prepared to wait years for blind justice to prevail.”); see, e.g., Mike
Spector, Takata U.S. Employees Saw Problems in Air-Bag Tests, WALL. ST. J. (Nov. 24,
2015, 7:24 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/article_email/takatas-u-s-employees-flagged-
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not only superiors295 but also coworkers and provide both moral and
psychological support.296 At MassMutual Financial the compliance
organization uses policies, posters, emails, blogs and other means of
communication to ensure its employees understand not only the
importance, but the obligation, to speak up if they see an issue they believe
may be unethical or a violation of regulation or law.
In addition, incentives matter:
If an employee is held accountable for traditional corporate tasks
whose performance will determine his success or failure, and is
also urged to undertake social objectives on which his
performance is not measured, the result is inevitable. Even the
most well-intentioned employee will devote his time and
attention to the functions on which his career progress depends.297
As Judge Doumar commented after a jury found Kidde liable for
misappropriating trade secrets belonging to X-It, a start-up that had
developed an innovative fire escape ladder:
This case is the very epitome of corporate governance in the last
decade of the twentieth century—where greed and the resultant
pressure on corporate officers to produce results out of line with
the actual value of the assets they manage turns those officers
into vultures, devouring the very businesses which they are trying
to enhance.298
Legally astute TMTs practice strategic compliance management with
the goal of adding, and not simply preventing the destruction of, firm value.
Thus, the construct extends beyond simple legal compliance and
encompasses the competitive advantage attainable when a firm goes
beyond what the law requires. For example, at a time when the Food and

reporting-issues-over-air-bags-1448411043-lMyQjAxMTE1MjIzNjgyMTYxWj
[perma.cc/9AAQ-293J] (“For a decade, Takata Corp. employees in the U.S. raised concerns
internally about misleading testing reports on air bags that later became prone to
explosions.”).
295. The Department of Veterans Affairs allegedly “silence[s] and punish[es]
whistleblowers.” In one case, after a food services manager at the Philadelphia site reported
faulty sanitation practices, his supervisors tried to fire him for eating “four old sandwiches”
that cost about $5; he was also reassigned to clean a morgue. Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, He
Blew the Whistle on the VA – and Then Was Almost Sacked for Eating Stale Sandwiches
WASH. POST. BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federaleye/wp/2015/09/21/he-blew-the-whistle-on-the-va-and-then-was-almost-sacked-for-eatingstale-sandwiches/ [perma.cc/29M3-VHLK].
296. BAGLEY, supra note 293.
297. DROTNING, supra note 195, at 259.
298. X-It Products, L.L.C. v. Walter Kidde Portable Equipment, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d
494, 546 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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Drug Administration was considering requiring firms to label their products
to show the amount of hydrogenated oils (trans fats) they contained,
PepsiCo’s Frito Lay division stopped using hydrogenated oils in its potato
chips and other snacks, then obtained Food and Drug Administration
approval to label its products prominently as having zero trans-fats.299
MassMutual Financial symmetrically used its knowledge of information
obtained in nationally available Death Master Files to both stop paying
annuities and to pay life insurance benefits, even though the life insurance
contracts require the beneficiary to provide proof of death before payment
is due.300
E. Shaping the Regulatory Environment
Firms do not act in isolation from the societal context in which they
operate,301 and they can help shape the rules that govern their conduct.302

299. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 77.
300. See March 18, 2014 email submitted by Todd G. Picken, Corporate Vice President
and Treasurer of MassMutual Financial Group, included on pages 183-184 of the Comments
Submitted in Response to 79 FR 11735 – Certification Program for Access to the Death
Master File, Federal Register Volume 79, Issue 41 (Mar. 3, 2014), available through the
U.S. Department of Commerce National Technical Information Service website. The email
states that MassMutual has used the Social Security Death Master File to “(1) determine if
periodic benefit payments were being paid to deceased contract owners or beneficiaries; (2)
identify in force life insurance policies with deceased insureds; and (3) as appropriate, to
reach out to those connected with the policies to begin the claims adjudication process.”
301. See generally BAGLEY, supra note 71 (demonstrating the way businesses can use
law and learn from past corporate scandals to succeed); BAGLEY, supra note 293, at 3
(stating that firms operate “within a broader social context”).
302. See BRUCE M. OWENS & RONALD BRAEUTIGAN, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC
USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 9 (1978) (discussing how regulatory agencies can be
strategically influenced by the firms they regulate); MIKE H. RYAN ET AL., CORPORATE
STRATEGY, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE FORTUNE 500: HOW AMERICA’S MAJOR CORPORATIONS
INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT (1987) (discussing corporations’ increasing effect on public policy
decisions); FRANK SHIPPER & MARIANNE M. JENNINGS, BUSINESS STRATEGY FOR THE
POLITICAL ARENA xviii (1984) (discussing the relationships between PACs, businesses, and
their influence in Washington); Vinod Aggarwal, Corporate Market and Nonmarket
Strategies in Asia: A Conceptual Framework, 3 BUS. & POL. 89 (2001) (evaluating “firm
strategies in Asia . . . which concern efforts to respond to and influence the politicaleconomic-social environment”); Bagley, supra note 190, at 3 (recognizing how “managerial
actions will affect the law and how it is interpreted and applied over time”); David P. Baron,
Integrated Strategy: Market and Nonmarket Components, 37 CAL. MGMT. REV. 47, 48
(Winter 1995) (defining one objective of a firm’s nonmarket strategy as shaping the firm’s
“market environment” by lobbying for certain legislation); Gerald D. Keim & Carl P.
Zeithaml, Corporate Political Strategy and Legislative Decision Making: A Revised
Contingency Approach, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 828, 828 (1986) (analyzing the “corporate
political efforts to influence. . .[legislative] decisions”); Douglas Schuler, Corporate
Political Strategy and Foreign Competition: The Case of the Steel Industry, 39 ACAD.
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Preston and Post submit, “there is an inherently interactive and symbiotic
relationship between the private business organization and the larger
society that constitutes its host environment.”303 Hence, “the task of
anticipating, understanding, evaluating, and responding to public policy
developments within the host environment is itself a critical managerial
task” wherein firms can realize value.304 Even jurists recognize this
symbiosis: in his dissenting opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,305 U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens noted that
“[b]usiness corporations must engage the political process in instrumental
terms if they are to maximize shareholder value.”306
Reflecting this relationship, the lead author developed an integrative
framework for understanding the interrelationship of a firm’s resources,
competitive environment, value proposition, activities in the value chain,
public law, and the broader societal context.307 The unit of analysis is the
TMT,308 which “evaluates and pursues opportunities for value creation and
capture while managing the attendant risks.”309 This is depicted in Figure
3.310

MGMT. J. 720 (1996) (“examin[ing] the political strategies of U.S. firms aimed at protecting
the domestic market from foreign competition”; Brian Shaffer, Firm-Level Responses to
Government Regulation: Theoretical Approaches, 21 J. MGMT. 495, 495 (1995) (discussing
how firms “advance their political interests through environmental scanning, lobbying,
political action committees (PACs), collation building . . . among others”); David B. Yoffie,
Corporate Strategy for Political Action: A Rational Model, in BUSINESS STRATEGY AND
PUBLIC POLICY: PERSPECTIVES FROM INDUSTRY AND ACADEMIA 92-111 (Alfred A. Marcus et
al. eds., 1987) (discussing lobbying and working with regulatory bodies); David B. Yoffie &
Sigrid Bergenstein, Creating Political Advantage: The Rise of The Corporate Political
Entrepreneur, 28 CAL. MGMT. REV. 124, 126 (1985) (suggesting that the goal of political
business strategy is to “secure access to key decision makers, influence policy, and enhance
the profitability of business operations”).
303. LEE E. PRESTON & JAMES E. POST, PRIVATE MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE
PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 12 (1975).
304. Id. at 4.
305. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
306. Id. at 454. As with other managerial functions, the board of directors has an
obligation to oversee compliance with applicable electioneering laws and to ensure that a
firm’s political activities, including corporate political contributions, are in accord with the
firm’s strategy and values. Constance E. Bagley, et al., A Board Member’s Guide to
Corporate Political Spending, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 30, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/10/aboard-members-guide-to-corporate-political-spending [perma.cc/2CK6-MUGS].
307. BAGLEY, supra note 293, at 3.
308. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 224-28.
309. BAGLEY, supra note 293, at 3.
310. Id.
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By, for example, engaging the political process, companies can create
firm value by helping to shape the “rules of the game.” 311 To do so, Yoffie
and Bergenstein called on firms to develop an entrepreneurial strategy for
creating and sustaining political advantage.312 Efforts to change the rules of
the game need to be integrated into a firm’s overall business strategy.313
The success of FedEx’s hub-and-spoke distribution system was
predicated, in part, on its ability to shape the regulations governing
commercial aircrafts. Frederick W. Smith, founder of Federal Express,
characterized this as
a very big part of the FedEx story which has hardly ever been
commented upon: The parallel effect of the relaxation of
government regulation which allowed FedEx to begin operations
to begin with, in what was really a loophole. And then it was
codified when airlines were deregulated in ‘77-’78. And then in
1980, the federal government deregulated interstate
transportation. So it was deregulation, much of which we
induced.314
The ultimate success of Uber, the car-sharing service, will depend in
substantial part on its ability to persuade livery regulators to regulate its
activities with a light touch. Uber promoted enactment of a California law
governing its activities. Although Uber was subsequently charged with
violating it, the law helped legitimize its activities.315 Uber also

311. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990); see generally BAGLEY, supra note 71 (discussing using the political
process to create value).
312. Yoffie & Bergenstein, supra note 302, at 126, 136 (for example, MCI’s business
and political strategies, which were designed to break AT&T’s monopolization of the
telecommunications industry, were “inextricably linked” and essential to MCI’s success).
313. Baron, supra note 302.
314. Online Extra: Fred Smith on the Birth of FedEx, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 19, 2004),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2004-09-19/online-extra-fred-smith-on-the-birth-offedex [perma.cc/7ERG-RTF7].
315. The California Public Utilities Commission enacted rules in 2013 to regulate
Transportation Network Companies (TNCs), which “provide prearranged transportation
services for compensation using an online-enabled application or platform (such as smart
phone apps) to connect drivers using their personal vehicles with passengers.”
Transportation
Network
Companies,
CAL.
PUBLIC
UTIL.
COMM’N,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/Enforcement/TNC/ [perma.cc/UU2H-YA7N] (last modified
May 11, 2015). In July 2015, an administrative law judge ruled that Uber should be fined
more than $7 million for violating a state law requiring it to report details of its rides,
including the number of requests it received for individuals using wheelchairs or
accompanied by a service animal. Laura J. Nelson et al., Uber Should Be Suspended in
California and Fined $7.3 Million, Judge Says, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2015, 5:59 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-suspended-20150715-story.html
[perma.cc/34HJ-8RBW].
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successfully reached an agreement in mid-2015 with the mayor of New
York City and the City Council to “collaborate” on a joint transportation
study to determine Uber’s effect on traffic and the environment.316 As a
result of the agreement, a proposed City Council bill, termed “onerous” by
some, that would have required Uber to stay within the city limits and
would have imposed a cap on the number of Uber drivers, has been
abandoned, at least for the time being.317 Uber’s “no-holds-barred
expansion strategy” has been less successful in parts of Europe and Asia.
Uber shut down its service in Frankfurt, Germany, after operating there for
less than two years,318 and it recently withdrew from Hamburg and
Düsseldorf as well.319 Uber reportedly “miscalculated how best to gain the
support of skeptical locals unaccustomed to its win-at-all-costs tactics” and
“underestimated the regulatory hurdles of doing business in Europe’s
largest economy.”320 Regulators in London are also “mulling changes” that
could severely restrict Uber’s expansion.321 Uber “faces regulatory
hurdles” in India as well, in addition to domestic competition.322 For
example, India allows only “for-hire vehicles,” and not individuals with
private cars, to offer rides using a smartphone application.323 In October
2015, the central Indian government issued non-binding guidelines that
require ride-hailing companies to obtain state permits to operate in a
specific location and give the states the right to set maximum fare
amounts.324 If implemented, these new rules may actually help Uber
expand into New Delhi, which had banned its services.325
The short-term housing rental service Airbnb spent more than $8

316. Ray Hennessey, New York City Caves on Plan to Cap Uber Drivers,
ENTREPRENEUR
(July
22,
2015),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/248729
[perma.cc/MP37-7KE3].
317. Id.
318. Mark Scott, Uber’s No-Holds-Barred Expansion Strategy Fizzles in Germany, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/technology/ubers-no-holdsbarred-expansion-strategy-fizzles-in-germany.html [perma.cc/DL6U-3S2E].
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Anindya Upadhyay, Uber Drivers in India Outearn Some Bankers. But for How
Long?,
BLOOMBERG
BUS.
(Oct.
19,
2015,
11:31
AM
PDT),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-19/uber-drivers-banker-beating-pay-inindia-cools-as-cabs-multiply [perma.cc/GVZ9-A294].
323. Id.
324. Siddharth Vikram Philip, India Said to Issue Guidelines for Uber, Other RideHailing
Apps,
BLOOMBERG BUS.
(Oct.
13,
2015,
5:47
AM
PDT),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-13/india-said-to-issue-guidelines-foruber-other-ride-hailing-apps-ifpd5y84 [perma.cc/X2MN-YQ36].
325. Id.
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million to defeat San Francisco Proposition F in November 2015.326 If
enacted, the Proposition would have limited users of Airbnb (and other
short-term housing rental sites) to a maximum of seventy-five days of
rentals per year, down from the existing ninety-day limit.327 Approximately
one week after the voters rejected Proposition F, Airbnb softened its tone
with regulators in San Francisco and elsewhere,328 “pledging a renewed
spirit of cooperation” and issuing the Airbnb Community Compact.329 The
Compact provides that the company will, for example, provide city
officials certain anonymous information about the hosts and guests using
its services, work to prevent illegal hotel landlords from operating on its
site, and pay its “‘fair share’” of applicable hotel and tourist taxes.330
In addition to working with regulators and engaging in political
activities, firms can use litigation to help level the competitive playing
field. Telecommunications firm U S West, a regulated telephone service
provider, sued to invalidate the regulations banning regulated providers
from selling cable television services to their subscriber base. U S West
successfully sued to invalidate those restrictions on the grounds that they
violated the firm’s free speech rights under the U.S. Constitution.331
Data miners for brand name drug manufacturers also used the First
Amendment to invalidate a Vermont statute that required physicians to opt
in before their physician-identifying prescribing information could be sold
to pharmaceutical companies.332 A drug company sales representative,333 as
well as Amarin Pharma, a brand name pharmaceutical manufacturer, and
four doctors,334 successfully challenged the Food and Drug
Administration’s ban on promoting off-label uses of pharmaceuticals as
unconstitutional restraints on their rights of free speech, in cases that could
have far-reaching implications for government regulation of commercial
speech.335
326. Elizabeth Weise, San Francisco Rejects Anti-Airbnb Measure, USA TODAY (Nov.
4, 2015, 1:06 p.m. EST), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/11/04/anti-airbnbmeasure-fails-san-francisco/75138092/ [perma.cc/W865-L8PR].
327. Id.
328. Mike Isaac, Airbnb Pledges to Work with Cities and Pay ‘Fair Share’ of Taxes,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/technology/airbnbpledges-to-work-with-cities-and-pay-fair-share-of-taxes.html [perma.cc/Q5PV-FNXZ].
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Bagley & Roellig, supra note 73 (citations omitted).
332. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
333. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
334. Peter J. Henning, FDA’s “Off-Label” Drug Policy Leads to Free-Speech Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/business/dealbook/fdasoff-label-drug-policy-leads-to-free-speech-fight.html [perma.cc/KM63-E7QR].
335. See Constance E. Bagley et al., Snake Oil Salesmen or Purveyors of Knowledge:
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TRAINING THE NEXT GENERATION OF LEGALLY ASTUTE
MANAGERS AND STRATEGICALLY ASTUTE LAWYERS

As the Academy of Legal Studies in Business (“ALSB”) has stated:
“Law and ethical behavior are foundational to civilized society. Legal
studies, an inclusive term that encompasses the diverse ways that law and
ethics shape the global environment of business, is an integral part of
business education and informs effective and responsible business
decisions and managerial behavior.”336 When Robert Aaron Gordon and
James Edwin Howell published the influential report Higher Education for
Business337 in 1959, most top business schools had at least one required
course in business law.338 By 2008, only four of the top twenty graduate
schools (as reported by Business Week or U.S. News & World Report)
required a course in business law or the legal environment of business—
Carnegie Mellon, Michigan, the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton
School, and Yale.339 A review of the MBA curriculum at the top twenty
business schools, as ranked by U.S. News & World Report in 2015,340 did
not reveal any core or required courses specifically dedicated to business
law or the legal environment of business. Three schools—the Stanford
Graduate School of Business, Harvard Business School, and New York
University’s Stern School of Business—required courses that included
consideration of legal issues, as described in their web-site course
descriptions.341 The Wharton School offers “Legal Studies and Business

Off-Label Promotions and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
337 (2013) (analyzing the judicial and regulatory effects on the commercial speech
doctrine).
336. Academy of Legal Studies in Business, ALSB Strategic Plan: Core Values (May 22,
2012), http://alsb.mobi/infobox/strategic-plan [perma.cc/54PG-6UEY].
337. ROBERT AARON GORDON & JAMES EDWIN HOWELL, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR
BUSINESS (1959).
338. Id. at 204.
339. Constance E. Bagley et al., Deep Links: Does Knowledge of the Law Change
Managers’ Perceptions of the Role of Law and Ethics in Business?, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 259,
265 (2010).
340. Best Business Schools Ranked in 2015, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://gradschools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-business-schools/mbarankings?int=9dc208 [perma.cc/3B4Q-2VQP] (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).
341. Stanford University requires “Strategy Beyond Markets,” which examines the
“legal, political, and social environments of business” in the decision-making arena.
Personalized
Curriculum,
STANFORD
GSB,
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/programs/mba/academic-experience/curriculum/first-yearcurriculum [perma.cc/ER3X-G8TT] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). Harvard University
requires “Leadership and Corporate Accountability,” in which the “legal, ethical and
economic responsibilities of corporate leaders” are examined. Required Curriculum,
HARVARD
BUSINESS
SCHOOL,
http://www.hbs.edu/mba/academic-
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Ethics” as part of its MBA flexible core curriculum.342
The increased emphasis on quantitative research in the wake of
Higher Education for Business343 has tended to marginalize legal
scholarship not based on law and economics or otherwise subject to
regression analysis.344 Yet, “the things routinely ignored by academics on
the grounds that they cannot be measured—most human factors and all
matters relating to judgment, ethics, and morality—are exactly what make
the difference between good business decisions and bad ones.”345 It is
experience/curriculum/Pages/required-curriculum.aspx [perma.cc/QT4Z-2HRC] (last visited
Jan. 31, 2016). The Executive MBA program at New York University’s Stern School of
Business requires “Professional Responsibility,” in which “the importance of understanding
the interdependence of markets, ethics and law in a democratic, free market society” are
examined.
Executive MBA Program, NYU STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS,
https://www.stern.nyu.edu/programs-admissions/executive-mba/academics/courseinformation [perma.cc/K3Z4-X5UR] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
342. Core Curriculum Structure, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA WHARTON MBA,
http://mba.wharton.upenn.edu/academics/curriculum/core/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).
343. GORDON & HOWELL, supra note 337, at 107.
344. NOHRIA & KHURANA, supra note 113; Richard T. Watson & Stefan Seidel, A Crisis
of Purpose, BIZED (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.bizedmagazine.com/your-turn/a-crisis-ofpurpose?utm_source=HighRoads%20Solutions&amp;utm_medium=Email&amp;utm_camp
aign=HighRoads%20All%20Emails [perma.cc/HP4Z-AK7S] (“Business schools are in a
teleological crisis because they have become homes for theory infrequently sullied by
practice, not agents for addressing business problems.”). Watson and Seidel note that the
publication of Higher Education for Business motivated business academics to apply
scientific principles to business research more aggressively, leading to a teleological shift.
Id. This prompted business schools to focus on “analysis over problem solving.” Id.
Certain scholars have posited that “practice influenced business research, not vice versa”;
others asserted that it was the practitioners, and not the pure scholars, who wrote the “most
influential business books.” Id. (citing Jeffrey Pfeffer & Christina T. Fong, The End of
Business Schools: Less Success than Meets the Eye, 1 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 78
(2002); Stephen Barley, Gordon Meyer & Debra Gash, Cultures of Culture: Academics,
Practitioners and the Pragmatics of Normative Control, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 24 (1980)); see
also Stewart Clegg, Managerialism: Born in the USA, 39 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 566, 572
(2014) (describing the “‘physic’ envy’ that had captured the business school professoriate in
the wake of the reforms prompted by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Commission”)
(citation omitted); Gianmarco Massameno, Practitioner Academics and Traditional
Academics: A Comparison of Institutional Experiences at the Harvard Business School 1-20
(2014) (unpublished master’s independent study, Harvard University) (on file with the third
author) (study finding that at the Harvard Business School (“HBS”), on average,
“practitioner academics reported a higher level of perceived respect that was statistically
significant from students, fellow practitioner academics, and MBAs—not from traditional
academics, PhDs, or the administration.” Faculty respondents commented that “respect for
practitioner academics fluctuated according to what HBS believes the cohort’s role should
be, or whether they should have a role at all. Other commenters associated increased
respect with increased research quality—a task more closely associated with traditional
academics than with practitioner academics.” (emphasis added)).
345. Warren G. Bennis & James O’Toole, How Business Schools Lost Their Way, HARV.
BUS. REV (May 2005), https://hbr.org/2005/05/how-business-schools-lost-their-way
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therefore not surprising that “[i]n surveys that the Aspen Institute regularly
conducts, M.B.A. candidates say they actually become less confident
during their time in business school that they will be able to resolve ethical
quandaries in the workplace.”346 Jeffrey C. Garten, former Dean of the
Yale School of Management, called “enhancing [business leaders’] ethical
education at a formative stage . . . arguably the highest priority that
business schools should have.”347 He continued: “All students, for
example, should gain a fundamental understanding of business law.”348
In 2012, the ALSB established a presidential task force on the State of
the Discipline,349 which was chaired by the lead author and later co-chaired
by Lucien Dhooge of the Scheller College of Business at Georgia Tech.350
The task force worked with the drafters of the revised AACSB standards to
ensure that proper attention was paid to legal and regulatory issues.351 The
new AACSB International accreditation standards, adopted in April 2013
and updated as of January 31, 2015, require coverage of the “[e]conomic,
political, regulatory, legal, technological, and social contexts of
organizations in a global society.”352
Notwithstanding the clear articulation of the standard, there is
anecdotal evidence that certain accreditation reviews occurring after the
new standards went into effect may not be devoting sufficient attention to
the requirement for adequate coverage of legal and regulatory matters. The
AACSB recently reaccredited graduate business programs at schools
ranging from the University of California at Los Angeles to Quinnipiac
University in Connecticut even though neither program has a required
[perma.cc/CMM3-2MUY].
346. Kelly Holland, Is It Time to Retrain B-Schools? N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 14, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/business/15school.html?_r=1
[perma.cc/A63MGRV8]; see also Watson & Seidel, supra note 344 (discussing the drift from problem
solving to analysis in business school education).
347. Jeffrey C. Garten, B-Schools: Only a C+ in Ethics, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2005-09-04/b-schools-only-a-c-plusin-ethics [perma.cc/RUX9-L6VE] (arguing that business schools can “teach students how to
apply value judgments when issues are not black and white.”).
348. Id.
349. Henry Lowenstein, Building the Manager’s Tool Box: Reflections of a Former
Business Dean on the State of Law in the Business Curriculum, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC.
347 (2013). Its members included then ALSB-AACSB liaison Peter Shedd of the
University of Georgia and current ALSB-AACSB liaison Janine Hiller of Virginia Tech.
Correspondence with the lead author on file with the lead author.
350. Correspondence with the lead author on file with the lead author.
351. Lowenstein, supra note 349.
352. AACSB INTERNATIONAL, ELIGIBILITY PROCEDURES AND ACCREDITATION
STANDARDS FOR BUSINESS ACCREDITATION 32 (2015), http://www.aacsb.edu//~/media/
AACSB/Docs/Accreditation/Standards/2013-bus-standards-update-jan2015.ashx [perma.cc/
YA5V-UP2C].
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course in business law or the legal environment of business.353 As with
interlocking directorships whereby the CEO of one firm heads the
compensation committee of the other, and vice versa, having a dean of one
school head the accreditation review committee of another school, and vice
versa, can color the objectivity of the individuals involved regarding the
relative importance of various topics, including legal studies in business.
As a result, we call on the AACSB to ensure that review committees pay
particular attention to requirements relating to teaching legal and regulatory
matters and that they do not permit a sitting dean (“Dean A”) of one school
(“School A”) to serve on the review committee for another school (“School
B”) if the sitting dean of School B serves on the review committee for
School A while Dean A is still the dean of School A and vice versa.
One area of special importance for aspiring business leaders is the law
of fiduciary duty, both as it relates to corporate opportunities354 and to the
broad duties officers and directors owe to shareholders, creditors, and other
constituencies, especially when a firm faces a possible change of control355
or enters the zone of insolvency.356 Of particular concern is the “principle”
of shareholder primacy taught in many U.S. finance and economic courses.
Such courses often overstate the duty of directors to maximize shareholder
value357 and understate the economic consequences of failing to act in the
best interest of the enterprise and manage for the long term.358 The law
governing the fiduciary duties of directors has evolved over time and

353. As to University of California at Los Angeles, interview with Constance E. Bagley,
Lead Author, Yale Law School, in New Haven, Connecticut, on February 23, 2015. As to
Quinnipiac, telephone interview with Constance E. Bagley, Lead Author, in Woodbridge,
Connecticut, on June 8, 2015.
354. See BAGLEY, supra note 293, at 620-21.
355. Id. at 621-32.
356. Id. at 741.
357. See Clegg, supra note 344, at 568 (the managerialism taught in U.S. business
schools lead to the precept that shareholder value was “preeminent”); see also STOUT, supra
note 69 (debunking the “myth” of shareholder primacy); Bagley, supra note 69 (discussing
constituency statutes that “expressly authorize the board to take into account the interests of
all constituencies” and the common law discretion of boards to look beyond the short-term
interests of shareholders in most situations); Bagley & Page, supra note 69, at 898, 921-27
(explaining that directors must act in the best interests of the corporation and may, absent a
change in control transaction or the inevitable break-up of the corporation, consider nonshareholder constituencies as long as (1) the directors are not improperly entrenching
themselves in office or disenfranchising shareholders and (2) any action taken to thwart a
corporate takeover is a reasonable response to the threat posed to the corporation).
358. See generally STOUT, supra note 69 (discussing the thinking that causes corporate
managers to focus on short-term earnings at the expense of long-term performance); Clegg,
supra note 344, at 570 (“Wall Street greed and political rhetoric were aided and abetted by
business education.”).
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requires more than the assignment of cases like Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.359
to educate future business leaders about what the law does and does not
require in this regard. For example, cases like Paramount Communications
Inc. v. Time Inc.360 make it clear that, except when a change in corporate
control or break-up of the corporation has become inevitable,361 shareholder
primacy is a managerial choice not a legal mandate.362 The Delaware
Supreme Court held that Time directors could legally thwart a fully
financed, any-or-all cash offer by Paramount supported by the vast majority
of the Time shareholders to protect Time’s “journalistic integrity” and the
“Time culture.” Knowing that the Time shareholders would vote down a
proposed stock-for-stock merger with Warner Brothers that was valued by
the market as worth less than the Paramount offer, the Time directors
restructured the deal as a leveraged buyout of Warner Brothers, which
burdened Time with $10 billion in new debt, to obviate the need for a Time
shareholder vote. Efforts by major Time shareholders, like CalPERS, to
require the Time board to let the shareholders choose which deal they
favored, failed. As Delaware Chancellor William Allen stated: “The
corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising
their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a
majority of shares.”363
Henry Mintzberg, Robert Simons, and Kunal Basu called the assertion
that companies exist solely to maximize shareholder value a “half-truth[]”
that contributed to the “syndrome of selfishness” among firms and
executives in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.364 They
further argued that focusing on shareholder value without taking into
account the interests of other stakeholders “reflects a fallacious separation
of the economic and social consequences of decisionmaking.”365 Even
shareholder-primacy proponent Michael Jensen acknowledged in the wake
of Enron and WorldCom that managers who neglect any corporate

359. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
360. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
361. This is often referred to as being in the “Revlon-mode,” after the eponymous case
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
362. Bagley, supra note 69. The directors of firms organized as B corporations are not
required to maximize shareholder value even when a change in control or break-up has
become inevitable. BAGLEY, supra note 293, at 583.
363. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989),
aff’d, 571 A. 2d 1140 (Del. 1990). Similarly, the Court of Chancery subsequently stated,
“[d]irectors are not thermometers, existing to register the ever-changing sentiments of
stockholders.” In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640 (Del. Ch. 2008).
364. Henry Mintzberg, Robert Simons & Kunal Basu, Beyond Selfishness, 44 MIT
SLOAN MGMT. REV., 66, 67-69 (2002).
365. Id. at 69.
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constituency will be unable to maximize the long-term market value of the
firm.366 Indeed, “[s]hort-term profit maximization at the expense of longterm value creation is a sure way to destroy value.”367
Both the Aspen Institute’s Program on Business and Society and the
Brookings Institution have sponsored research symposia to examine the
purpose of the firm and generate non-technical, student-friendly teaching
materials on the subject.368 The lead author’s ethical business leader’s
decision tree, originally published in Harvard Business Review369 and set
forth in Figure 4, provides a tool that students, managers, and lawyers can
use to assess the legality and ethics of a proposed business decision.

366. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the
Corporate Objective Function, 14.3 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 7, 9 (2001) (“In order to
maximize value, corporate managers must not only satisfy, but enlist the support of, all
corporate stakeholders—customers, employees, managers, suppliers, local communities.”).
367. Id. at 16.
368. For example, as part of the Aspen Institute’s symposia on purpose of the firm, Sally
Blout, the Dean of the Kellogg School at Northwestern, has called for a relatively short
document that could be circulated to business school deans and faculty to explain the
fiduciary duties of directors in a lay-person’s terms. Interview by Constance E. Bagley with
Judith Samuelson, Head of the Aspen Institute’s Center for Business and Society, in New
York, New York, on April 26, 2013. Dean Blout describes Kellogg’s mission as follows:
“Our purpose is to educate, equip and inspire leaders who build strong organizations and
wisely leverage the power of markets to create lasting value.” Sally Blout, Message from
the
Dean,
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/about/from_the_dean.aspx
[perma.cc/ALV5-MAXZ] (emphasis added). A Harvard Business School note written by
Carliss Baldwin of Harvard Business School and the lead author has a similar purpose but
does not include the latest court cases. Constance E. Bagley, Carliss Baldwin & John
Quinn, M&A Legal Context: Basic Framework for Corporate Governance, Harvard
Business School Note 803-200 (2003). Recent cases can be found in BAGLEY, supra note
293, at 610-37.
369. Constance E. Bagley, The Ethical Leader’s Decision Tree, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb.
2003, at 19.
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FIGURE 4: THE ETHICAL BUSINESS LEADER’S DECISION TREE

Judicial opinions (especially when excerpted to make them more
accessible to business school students370) and business-school cases based
on such opinions371 offer business school students rich fodder for analysis
and discussion. As the founders of modern business policy and strategy
explain, business leaders must ask not only what they can do but also what
they should do. In addition, instructors can use so-called Harvard Business
School-type cases, which present students with a complicated fact pattern
and then require them to play the protagonist and present and defend their
proposed solution to the decision at hand, to enhance legal literacy. Often,
the best legal studies cases include both business and legal issues so
students can practice incorporating legal and ethical considerations into
370. See, e.g., BAGLEY, supra note 293 (containing both excerpted and summarized court
cases that are used in business programs at more than one hundred colleges and universities)
(publisher adoption list on file with the lead author.).
371. See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley, Meinhard, Salmon, and the Bristol Hotel, Yale
School of Management Case No. 07-032 (2007) (addressing the fiduciary duty one joint
venture owes another when offered a new opportunity, based on Meinhard v. Salmon, 164
N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928)); Northeast General (A), Yale School of Management Case No. 07035 (2007) (including discussion questions about whether one party had a right to sue the
corporation and what language could have been added to the contract); Northeast General
(B), Yale School of Management Case No. 07-036 (2007) (stating that the majority
distinguishes Meinhard v. Salmon when holding that a mere finder does not have a fiduciary
duty to disclose to his client the unsavory reputation of a potential buyer while the
dissenting judge argues that disclosure is both legally and ethically required).
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their managerial analysis. For example, when the leaders at Research in
Motion must decide whether to make their BlackBerry encryption codes
available to various governments, they must consider both their
competitive advantage vis-à-vis competitors like Apple and Google and the
varying privacy protections offered in UAE, India, Europe, and Canada,
including the historic antecedents.372
Although the case method pioneered by Christopher Columbus
Langdell at Harvard Law School, which is designed to teach law school
students “how to think like a lawyer” by reading and discussing judicial
opinions in a Socratic manner, helps prepare future litigators,373 it hardly is
adequate to train students how to be “transaction cost engineers”374 and
“enterprise architects.”375 For example, “R&D [is] carried out in a virtual
Cambrian explosion of organizational forms,”376 which are shaped at least
in part by business lawyers. Training a student to organize a venture or to
do deals by reading court opinions is a bit like training a student to be a
physician by reading autopsy reports. It hones analytic skills and is
informative of what to avoid but hardly provides practice in crafting
372. Constance E. Bagley et al., Research in Motion: Compromise Blackberry Security,
or Give Up Emerging Markets, Yale School of Management Case No. 11-011 (2011).
373. Even that is debatable. As Gillian Hadfield recounted:
Mark Chandler, General Counsel of Cisco Systems Inc., spoke to me about how
hard it is to find litigation firms that know how to think about litigation strategy
in light of a raft of public and investor relations concerns. He recounted the
story of Cisco’s litigation with a Chinese competitor that Cisco believed had
violated its patent rights.
Early in the process his outside litigators
recommended filing some pre-trial motions. Chandler asked if they would win
those motions. The answer from his expert litigators was no, but those motions
can be used to educate the judge about the issues. Chandler’s response: “Don’t
you guys get it? This lawsuit was all over the news the day it was filed. When
we lose those motions the headlines the next hour read, “Cisco loses first round
to competitor” and the finance guys are going berserk.” Chandler wants a
litigation team that has expertise in thinking about strategy beyond the
courtroom.
Hadfield, supra note 213.
374. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239, 255 (1984). For a further discussion of how lawyers create value
in transactions, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transaction Lawyering, 12
STAN. J.L., BUS & FIN. 486, 498-99 (2007) (discussing a hypothesis that transactional
lawyers add value by reducing regulatory costs, not by reducing transaction costs or by
reducing information asymmetry).
375. George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 279,
289-93 (2009) (explaining that business lawyers organize and reorganize firms; structure
joint ventures, licensing arrangements and other strategic alliances; practice preventative
law; protect intellectual property; and handle regulatory matters).
376. Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of Technology,
Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885, 887 (2010).
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successful outcomes. According to Noll,
The ossification of legal practice that is the theme of Professor
Hadfield’s article377 arises from two characteristics of legal
education: an orientation towards effective advocacy and an
emphasis on basing analysis on parallels with precedent. These
features of legal education create a backwards-looking focus on
winning disputes rather than a forward-looking focus on
innovative solutions to new problems.378
For that practice, the Harvard Business School case method is far more
effective.
The good news is that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive;
they can be used at both law schools and business schools to prepare both
future lawyers and future managers to work together more effectively. For
example, the lead author prepared a variety of Harvard-style cases while on
the faculty at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, the Harvard
Business School, and the Yale School of Management, suitable for use at
both business schools and law schools.379 Court cases, either full-text or
excerpted in a law-school casebook,380 or, in the case of business school
students, excerpted or summarized in a text,381 can be coupled with
Harvard-style cases and business theory382 both to teach legal reasoning and
black-letter law and to teach managerial skills and theory. The Harvard
Law School has developed a Case Studies Program that supports various
“case development projects throughout Harvard Law School.”383 Harvard’s
377. Hadfield, supra note 213.
378. Roger G. Noll, Impediments to Innovation in Legal Infrastructure, 8 I/S: J. L. POL’Y
INFO. SOC. 60, 61 (2012).
379. For a list, including the legal topics addressed, see the tab for business school
teaching materials on the entrepreneurship law site sponsored by the Kauffman Foundation
entrepshiplaw.org.
380. For a classic treatment integrating law and finance, see VICTOR BRUDNEY &
WILLIAM W. BRATTON, BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN’S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATE FINANCE (4th ed. 1993) (containing examples of full text or excerpted cases).
381. Based on the lead author’s experience at Stanford, Harvard and Yale, it is the rare
business school student who will devote the time and effort to read multiple full-text legal
opinions. She has found that a text that includes both summarized and excerpted cases and
“hornbook”-type text is a more effective way to teach business law to business students and
executives.
See, e.g., BAGLEY, supra note 293 (offering a comprehensive yet
understandable legal text for business students); BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 280
(explaining the various legal stages of starting a business. Business Insider included the
third edition of this text in its twenty-five must-read books for entrepreneurs; it is used at
more than one hundred business and law schools. The publisher adoption list is on file with
the lead author).
382. See, e.g., BRUDNEY & BRATTON, supra note 380 (containing examples of full text or
excerpted cases).
383. Case
Studies
Program,
HARVARD
LAW
SCHOOL,
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Case Development Initiative creates case studies that are used in Executive
Education and law classes on topics that include “career dilemmas that
lawyers face and management issues that law firms and professional
service firms experience,” exposing participants to “real-world problems
that lawyers and firm leaders confront, and help them work through
possible approaches and solutions.”384
In his class “Introduction to In-House Practice of Law” at the
University of Colorado Law School, co-author Roellig uses the business
school case study approach instead of the more traditional analysis of court
cases used in most law schools. The students, who include both law
students and new in-house attorneys, work with case studies based on real
fact patterns. They are called upon to evaluate the various options as
additional information is provided, just as happened in the real world.
Students learn that decisions are not static, but continue to evolve as more
facts become available or change. In addition, they learn that both counsel
and managers must take into account the interests and likely reactions of
many different stakeholders, including regulators. The course gives the
students the opportunity to practice exercising “good judgment”385 and
effective decision- making. The discussion of each case study concludes
with an overview of how the matter in reality played out, good or bad. His
guest speakers have included the general counsel of Cisco, Verizon,
Prudential Financial, Clorox, Viacom, Gates and DeVita. An overriding
theme of the class is that the right legal answer is not always the right
answer for the business. That is, just because something is legal does not
mean that it is wise to do it. Even when a lawyer can conclude that a
particular position is legal under the current facts and law, the situation can
evolve very quickly when viewed under the microscope of societal values
and public opinion.
University of Colorado Law School Dean Philip J. Weiser
commented:
Today’s law students need to learn not only to “think like
lawyers,” but also to “think like clients.” The creative problem
solving skills that are associated with in-house lawyers, along
with their business skills and knowledge of their business, are
core competencies for all lawyers. Thanks to the leadership of
Mark Roellig in developing a unique course offering, Colorado

http://casestudies.law.harvard.edu/case-studies-program/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2016)
[perma.cc/CE3X-NUT8].
384. About
Harvard
Law
Case
Studies,
HARVARD
LAW
SCHOOL,
http://casestudies.law.harvard.edu/about-harvard-law-case-studies/ [perma.cc/F2W8-Z8LG]
(last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
385. See discussion supra Part III.C (defining good corporate judgment).
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Law is able to provide our law students with an opportunity to
learn from highly accomplished professionals, to use case studies
that take them into the board room setting, and to learn alongside
in-house lawyers. With the benefit of this course, and
complementary programs like our Technology Lawyer
Accelerator, we are seeing an increasing number of in-house
leaders willing to hire law students to make a positive impact
right after graduation.386
Legal and strategic astuteness are particularly important in the new
economy. According to Hadfield:
Fast-paced, global, niche-driven, and increasingly networkrather than firm-based, the economy today is poorly served by
legal markets and institutions developed to meet the demands
generated by an economy based on standardized mass-market
manufacturing, predominantly domestic markets, and production
organized within, rather than across, firm boundaries. Today’s
legal infrastructure . . . is too slow, cumbersome, and complicated
(and hence too costly) to manage the explosion in the number and
heterogeneity of legal relationships and regulatory settings that
characterize today’s global web-based entities, facing shorter
product (and strategy) lifecycles and fluid business models.387
She posits:
“legal infrastructure”—the legal resources available to
individuals, organizations, and regulators to help govern
relationships—is critical to support and regulate the
transformations of the new economy. Legal infrastructure
provides important intangible connections—invisible bridges—
between consumers, suppliers, investors, innovators, and
regulators. It includes the formal rules produced by courts and
legislators but, more importantly, it also includes the knowledge,
practices, norms, and resources of legal practitioners: the
solutions and advice provided by lawyers; the procedures of
courts and arbitrators; the contract templates stored in public and
private databanks; the shared beliefs about liability risks and
optimal strategies; the accumulated wisdom and biases of
experienced advocates and adjudicators, educators, and
negotiators.388
As Hadfield explains: “Collectively, these legal resources translate formal

386. E-mail from Philip J. Weiser, Dean, Univ. of Colo. Law School to Mark Roellig,
Adjunct Faculty, (Aug. 19, 2015) (on file with the lead author).
387. See Hadfield, supra note 213, at 8.
388. Id. at 7.

ARTICLE 4_BAGLEY 2-17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

488

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

2/17/16 7:39 PM

[Vol. 18:2

rules into actual behavior and decision making by economic actors.”389
This failure of the legal infrastructure to adapt to the exponential, nonlinear nature of the new economy is particularly problematic in areas such
as healthcare, bioscience, genomics, data analytics, energy, and information
transmission and exchange. Hadfield attributes this maladaptation in part
to “the severe limitations on who may produce legal rules and other legal
inputs (such as advice, document templates, norms and practices) imposed
by our continued reliance on publicly produced rules and the excessively
closed nature of our lawyer- and judge-controlled legal markets.”390 We
agree with Noll that law schools are partially to blame for not adequately
training lawyers for the new economy,391 but we also fault business schools
for not promoting legal literacy and providing future managers the
opportunity to practice the exercise of informed judgment. As all of our
above observations, critiques, and prescriptions are context-dependent, we
now turn attention to non-American contexts and the unifying force of
globalization.
VI.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL: NEW DATA, PREDICTIONS, AND PRESCRIPTIONS

This section briefly explores the current and anticipated effects of
“globalization”392 on in-house counsel and their corporate clients. We
discuss the changing role of general counsel in the United Kingdom
(“U.K.”), then present new data on the role of in-house counsel in Sweden.
This section concludes by identifying the unwelcome consequences of
malfeasance abroad together with the counteracting benefits our concepts
of legal and strategic astuteness provide legal practitioners (especially chief
legal officers) and managers outside the United States.
The process of globalization occurs iteratively, largely country by
country or by group of countries (wherein the United States often leads,
followed respectively by phase two, with the U.K., phase three, with
Continental Europe, and phase four, with emerging nations). Globalization
has acted as a force pushing lawyers in Continental Europe and the socalled BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) to emulate the Anglo-

389. Id.
390. Id. at 2.
391. Noll, supra note 378.
392. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 9 (2002) (defining
“globalization” as “the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world, which
has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and
communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services,
capital, knowledge, and . . . people across borders.”).
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American normative model of legal expertise.393
But legal convergence is an evolutionary and non-linear process. In
Europe, soft law instruments aimed at harmonization of different legal
systems, often elaborated by academic groups, have become increasingly
important. They include The Draft Common Frame of Reference
(DCFR)394 and The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).395
Courts often cite them, causing practitioners and scholars to regard them as
sources of law.
Thus, there is a spectrum in which globalization operates that
measures the degree to which barriers can or should be broken down.
Certain barriers may serve a more beneficial function when preserved than
when eliminated. In such cases,
transnationalization preserves the sovereign rights of nations,
protecting what could otherwise be broken down in a more
globalized regime. The licensing and regulation of attorneys is a
case in point.
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) rejected the idea that in-house
counsel can act independently of management when it refused to extend
attorney-client privilege to communications with in-house lawyers:396
The company lawyer’s economic dependence and close ties with
the company (i.e., its employer), puts him in a different position
to that of the external lawyer according to the ECJ. The ECJ’s
rationale, following Advocate General Kokott’s opinion of 29
April 2010, is that regardless of a company lawyer being
registered with a Bar or Law Society and the professional ethic
obligations that he is subject to, his position as an employee of
the company (and not as an independent lawyer) does not allow
him to ignore the commercial strategies pursued by his client,
thereby, affecting his ability to exercise professional
independence.
On this basis, communications between
commercial managers and their company lawyers should not be
subject to legal professional privilege.397

393. Sida Liu, The Legal Profession as a Social Process: A Theory on Lawyers and
Globalization, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 670, 682-85 (2013).
394. STUDY GRP. ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & ACQUIS GRP., PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS
AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE
(DCFR): OUTLINE EDITION (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009) (ebook).
395. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando et al. eds.,
2000); PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: PART III (Ole Lando et al. eds., 2003).
396. Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Eur. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-08301.
397. Philippe Coen, Introduction to Company Lawyers: Independent by Design, An
ECLA White Paper, at 12 (Philippe Coen & Christophe Roquilly eds., 2012),
http://www.ecla.org/files/files/Profession/document1.pdf [perma.cc/RFQ4-2HZR].
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We agree with the European Company Lawyers Association White
Paper “Company Lawyers: Independent by Design,” which calls for
a drastic rethinking of the way the legal function should be
viewed and considered nowadays in a globalized system where
more than ever, the economy needs strong companies and
companies cannot survive strongly without a valued and forceful
legal function, caring for the compliance and citizenship of the
company with a high level of ethics within: the legal department
independently minded while remaining a management business
partner and close advisor.398
As Chayes and Chayes chronicled happening earlier in the United
States:399
Company lawyers have developed their influence via innovation.
Company lawyers have learnt how to be more present and
visible, they have improved their ability to innovate and be
creative with leadership, they have improved their interacting
skills, their self recognition into strong ethical values and they
have enhanced their image of trust and accountability.400
We agree with the following characterization of in-house counsel’s
capacity to work with managers to ensure firms win with integrity, but we
caution that unchecked entrepreneurialism can impede it:
They [company lawyers] are committed to appear trustworthy not
only as lawyers but also as leaders. Company lawyers are the
ones creating internal policies, soft laws, codes of conduct: they
have no other choice to act with care, confidence and wisdom
which are the prolegomenon of independency. Indeed, integrity
is a natural skill among our profession as this is the way we ought
to be identified within the company and within the society in
general. Integrity is the attribute of independency; it is the bread
and butter of a company lawyer’s everyday practice: setting the
example, always. Leading a life of integrity and independency is
neither an obstacle nor a burden, it’s an outlook. We can be
optimistic to believe that all lawyers, company lawyers included,
share that outlook and we can be trustful that such an outlook
towards independence is by itself a professional and
philosophical emulation. Independency and objectivity as part of
ethics are part of our DNA; and far from being a burden they
constitute the rewards of the company lawyer’s profession.
Company lawyers are not employees like any other. Because of

398. Id.
399. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 86.
400. Coen, supra note 397, at 12-13.
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their training, because of their ethics, because of their
professional rules, because of their specific approach to things
and issues, it’s time to show that company lawyers can make a
difference and self-assert that difference.401
Finally, we believe the attorney-client privilege should also apply to inhouse counsel. Although the roles can be different, in-house and outside
counsel have the same legal and ethical obligations; their clients should be
afforded the same protections and privilege to provide for candid
communications and ensure proper legal counsel.402
A. The Anglo-American Nexus
Originally characterized by American dominance and leadership, the
Anglo-American legal nexus403 is now more accurately characterized by
national parity (albeit delayed).404 John Flood argues that significant
differences in each nation’s legal context account for the initial disparity in
the nations’ respective global legal prominence, namely (1) U.K. solicitors’
relative lack of litigation experience, (2) U.K. law firms’ relative lack of a
large domestic legal market, (3) U.K. law firms’ relative lack of strong and
longstanding ties with globally known financial firms with which to partner
in legal transactions, and (4) U.K. law firms’ relative lack of established
foreign office locations.405
Recent changes in the British legal
infrastructure, however, diminish this disadvantage and place “U.K.
firms . . . now on par with U.S. firms.”406 They include (1) limited reform
allowing solicitors some ability to appear in court unaccompanied by
barristers; (2) the Legal Services Act (“LSA”) of 2007,407 allowing lawyer
and even non-lawyer ownership of U.K. law firms to inject them with
capital and promote their global competitiveness; and (3) the recent longterm rally of the U.K financial sector.408 It is very possible that this

401. Id. at 13.
402. Bagley & Roellig, supra note 212, at 120.
403. John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers: The Role of Elite Law Firms in International
Business Transactions, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 54 (2007).
404. See John Flood, Institutional Bridging: How Large Law Firms Engage in
Globalization, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2013) (“[U.K. law firms] are
now on par with U.S. firms.”).
405. Id. at 1089-93.
406. Id. at 1090.
407. Id. at 1098.
408. Job openings in London’s financial sector increased 18% in 2014, due in part to a
22% increase in the last quarter of the year, “the biggest increase since 2010.” Ambereen
Choudhury, London Finance Job Vacancies Jumped 18% in 2014, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan.
4,
2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-05/london-finance-job-
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injection of investment and venture capital may drive efficiencies and
innovation that will advantageously disrupt law, to the benefit of clients
and consumers. The failure of other legal systems to do this, including in
the United States, could cause a competitive disadvantage since such
systems will not benefit from these innovations and efficiencies. The
nexus draws strength from several international commonalities, including
(1) a shared use of the common law system, the legal system most widelyused and most conducive to the ad-hoc, fluid nature of globalization; (2)
strong, globally-preeminent financial centers; (3) an ability to think locally
but operate globally; and (4) their longstanding tradition of engaging in
transnational legal transactions.409
B. In-House Counsel in Sweden
If globalization scholars are correct, and general counsel in
Continental Europe and the BRICs follow the American-Anglo model of
general counsel, then we can expect these counsel to confront the moral
hazards posed by Nelson and Nielsen’s American entrepreneurial lawyer,
making our prescriptions applicable to the global context.
The
globalization scholarship offers few data on this issue. To help fill this gap,
we present here an original study of the role of general counsel in Sweden.
Sweden is a small Scandinavian country with a population of more
than nine million people, marked by its international neutrality, broad
social welfare, and export-powered wealth.410 Sweden remained neutral
during both World Wars, which allowed the country to avoid the major
reconstruction periods during twentieth century Europe. It became a major
exporter due to the trade barriers between nations involved in these wars.
Since the conclusion of World War II through the present day, the Swedish
economy has been dependent on its openness and trade.
Currently a little less than half of Sweden’s GDP is from exports,
compared with about 13% for the United States.411 Sweden primarily
exports refined petroleum, medicine, phones, vehicles, and vehicle parts.412
vacancies-jumped-18-in-2014-astbury-says [perma.cc/D9G7-KRJP].
409. Flood, supra note 404, at 1089-97.
410. See
Sweden
in
Figures,
EXPORT.GOV,
http://www.export.gov/sweden/doingbusinessinsweden/swedeninfigures/index.asp
[perma.cc/BL3Y-QZ2Q] (last updated Mar. 21, 2011) (listing facts about Sweden); Sweden
Population
2015,
WORLDPOPULATIONREVIEW,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/sweden-population/ [perma.cc/P83X-X9QQ]
(last visited Jan. 31, 2016) (detailing Sweden’s population).
411. 4.8 World Development Indicators: Structure of Demand, WORLD BANK,
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/4.8 (last updated Oct. 9, 2015).
412. Alex Simoes, Sweden, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY,
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Their main customers are located in Western and Northern Europe in
addition to the United States and China.413 Sweden has a highly
concentrated banking sector, with the four largest banking groups (Nordea,
Svenska Handelsbanken, Swedbank, and SEB) accounting for 80% of the
assets.414 About 70% of the Swedish labor force is unionized.415 As of
2014, of the 4.59 million Swedish employees, about 3.79 million are in the
service industry.416 For its size, Sweden has a bevy of varied successful
companies, including ABB Ltd., AstraZeneca, Ericsson, Skanksa, H&M,
and Spotify, which have found success in engineering, pharmaceuticals,
communication technology, construction, retail, and media, respectively.
Sweden’s legal market has not kept pace with its corporate
achievements. Only the largest twenty-three of the top fifty Swedish law
firms have more than fifty lawyers; only thirteen law firms have more than
one hundred attorneys.417 Sweden has a liberal definition of lawyers. Any
individual may legally practice law, without the need for a formal legal
education or admission to the bar.418 In addition, anyone may represent
himself or herself or another litigant in any court in Sweden.419 Sweden
does, however, have a bar called the Swedish Bar Association (Sveriges
advokatsamfund), which was formed in 1887.420 The members of the
Swedish Bar Association have a legally protected exclusive right to call
themselves “advokat”; thus, although anyone can potentially represent
litigants, it is typically the advokats who are the legal representatives in
court.421
The Swedish Bar Association prohibits in-house lawyers from

http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/swe/ [perma.cc/5TF2-TUFL] (last visited Jan. 31,
2016).
413. Id.; Sweden in Figures, supra note 410.
414. List of Banks in Sweden, BANKS SWEDEN, http://bankssweden.com (last visited Jan.
31, 2016) [perma.cc/LEB9-ESXL].
415. Working in Sweden: Workers’ Rights and Unions, SWEDISH INS.,
http://work.sweden.se/living-in-sweden/workers-rights-and-unions/[perma.cc/C6VW-63ZG]
(last visited Dec. 29, 2015).
416. Employment by activities and status (ALFS), OECD,
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=9185 [perma.cc/RQM2-F36K] (last updated Nov.
7, 2015).
417. Friederike Heine, Sweden: It all goes around again, LEGALWEEK (Apr. 15, 2010),
http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/1601229/sweden-it-goes
[perma.cc/J93JXJTS].
418. The Swedish Bar Association, 46 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN LAW 323, 323 (2004).
419. Id.
420. About
Us,
SWEDISH
BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.advokatsamfundet.se/Advokatsamfundet-engelska/About-us/ [perma.cc/YY4XLHYZ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
421. The Swedish Bar Association, supra note 418, at 324.
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becoming members of the Bar Association.422 To become and maintain
their title, advokats must work for, or form a company with another
adovkat.423 This required separation from non-legal management “is seen
as a corner stone of professional independence.”424
The Swedish Bar Association has been moving towards a less
restrictive club. Effective January 1, 2011, the Bar Association changed
the rules of admission to the bar from a five-year to three-year requirement
of practice following graduation from law school.425 A desire to help
Swedish attorneys remain competitive with their counterparts from other
European jurisdictions motivated this change.426
In 2010, the Swedish Company Lawyers Association administered an
electronic questionnaire (the “Swedish Survey”), prepared by the lead
author, Christophe Roquilly of ADHEC Business School in Nice, France,
and Boel Flodgren of Lund University, to the Association’s 900-plus
members. The Swedish Survey included forty-six questions centering on
the roles each corporation’s in-house lawyers (“IHLs”) play in the
Continental European context.427 There were seventy-nine responses to
many questions, but only sixty-seven respondents answered all questions.
All percentages were based on the number of respondents answering that
question. Although participant companies requested anonymity, they
represented a wide swath of Sweden’s most prominent companies in terms
of name recognition, overall size, and revenue. Annual revenues ranged
from €5 million to €50 billion, with thirty-four of the seventy-nine total
respondent companies generating more than €1 billion in annual revenues
in various industries, including financial services, telecom, medical
equipment, software, engineering, energy, food, and media. Of the
respondent companies, 55% were more than fifty years old, with 35%
eleven to fifty years old, and 11% were ten years old or younger.
The number of IHLs worldwide ranged from one to 411, with 11% of
the 79 Swedish respondent companies employing one IHL, 46% employing
two to ten, 20% employing eleven to thirty, 6% employing thirty-one to
fifty, and 14% employing more than fifty-one IHLs. The number of IHLs
based in Sweden ranged from zero to thirty, with 73% of the Swedish

422.
423.
424.
425.

Id. at 323.
Id.
Id.
INT’L BAR ASSOC., Professional Qualifications for the Legal Profession in Sweden,
BAR
ISSUES
COMMISSION
(July
27,
2011),
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=339B706D-B166-4644BD67-C8E5477876D7 [perma.cc/9NCZ-UP6Q].
426. Id.
427. The text of both the survey and the cover letter are on file with the lead author.
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respondents reporting two to ten IHLs in Sweden. Fifty-six percent of the
Swedish respondents reported that the first IHLs were hired ten to fifty
years ago, with 33% being hired less than ten years ago, and 11% more
than fifty years ago.
Twenty-eight percent of the Swedish respondents reported that they
had hired thirteen or more outside law firms in the last calendar year, with
25% hiring four to six, 20% two to three, 13% ten to twelve, 10% seven to
nine, 3% one, and 1% none. Of the seventy Swedish respondents, 19%
agreed that non-lawyers in their firm communicate directly with outside
lawyers; 19% were neutral; 64% disagreed or strongly disagreed.428 57%
of the seventy respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the outside
lawyers understand the hiring firm’s business; 20% were neutral; and 23%
disagreed or strongly disagreed.
The data collected in the Swedish Survey echo Nelson and Nielsen’s
central findings regarding American lawyers,429 namely that lawyers tend to
act as counsel (providing both legal advice) most often, with 75% of the
seventy-one Swedish respondents characterizing their role as lawyer,
followed by entrepreneur (21%), and finally cop (4%).430 Fifty percent of
the American lawyers surveyed by Nelson and Nielsen self-identified as
counsel, 33% as entrepreneurs, and 17% as cops.431 Of the 71 Swedish
respondents, 68% strongly agreed that their IHLs were “service oriented”;
17% agreed with this characterization; and 3% were neutral.
Asked to identify “a primary mission of the legal department,” with
any or all of the following six choices available, the seventy-one Swedish
responses yielded means on the five-point Likert scale for the various
choices as follows:

428.
429.
430.
431.

•

To reduce legal risk: 4.62

•

To advise the rest of the company on legal matters: 4.45

•

To propose solutions in order to make easier or to achieve
the completion of a project: 4.28

•

To contribute to value creation by the company: 4.28

•

To reduce business risk: 4.06

Here and elsewhere numbers may add up to more than 100% due to rounding.
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 109, at 464-65.
The text of both the survey and the cover letter are on file with the lead author.
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 109, at 468.
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To ensure legal compliance: 3.94.

Asked to rank order—from one for the most frequent to four for the
least frequent—four descriptions of what IHLs are most often called upon
to do, 90% of the seventy-one respondents ranked first responding to legal
queries with legal advice; 6% ranked proposing new legal solutions second;
4% ranked anticipating the needs of managers third; and 65% ranked
helping formulate business strategy fourth.
Of the seventy-one
respondents, 44% ranked serving on integrated project teams as the most
frequent structure for their work; 42% ranked working with specific
business units on a permanent basis second; and 39% ranked focusing on
legal issues in an independent and autonomous way third.
When asked to indicate any or all of four descriptions of their
company’s political lobbying activities, 54% of the seventy-one Swedish
respondents indicated that their firm lobbies in anticipation of specific
proposed legislation or proposed regulations; 44% in response to specific
enacted legislation or promulgated regulations; 31% not at all; and 28% to
shape public policy regardless of what legislation or regulation is pending.
Of the seventy-one respondents, 51% work with trade or industry
associations to advocate for their political interests; 37% prepare position
papers or technical reports; 35% engage in face-to-face meetings with
regulators (state or federal); 34% indicated that they do not engage in any
political lobbying activities (which is at odds with the 31% answer
described immediately above); 7% hire outside counsel with political
lobbying experience; 7% conduct press conferences; and 1% acts as experts
in legislative work.
Sixty-four percent of the Swedish respondents indicated that their firm
has a legal culture. Descriptions varied:
• “[A]merican blame culture”
•

“Do more or less everything legal”

•

“Re legal culture: there is a relatively broad awareness amongst
the managerial top layers of the legal matters policy in place
(which contains the fundamental principals [sic] for the
involvement by the legal department). This is however still not
the case further down the organization.”

•

“It is pretty well established when to turn to the legal
department and in my opinion this works very well most of the
time”
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•

“It is based on a fundamental respect for the law and
understanding that the risk we as a firm wish to take on should
be well analyzed and defined. Risk should as principle not
come from the structure of our transactions, but from the
market we choose to expose our assets against”

•

“Legal and regulatory integrity and trust is [sic] an
instrumental part of value creation”

•

“It is not a goal to live up to our rules, it is the first step.”

The Swedish data echo Nelson and Nielsen’s findings concerning
American in-house counsel, namely, that their practice primarily centers on
a mix of law and business.432 Ninety-six percent of the seventy-one
Swedish respondents strongly agreed or agreed there was an expectation
that IHLs understand the fundamentals of the business; 4% were neutral,
yielding a mean of 4.65 on a one to five point Likert scale. As one
Swedish respondent put it: “The services of the IHLs are integrated into the
system of operation on all levels, business, strategy, finance, compliance
and so on and so forth.” This set of expectations could explain why most
lawyers see themselves as operating within a middle space between the cop
and entrepreneur models.
The role of IHLs in Sweden in developing strategy and the close ties
with the top management team parallel Nelson and Nielsen’s finding of
entrepreneurialism in American counsel. Notwithstanding the fact that a
majority of Swedish counsel self-identified as fitting the counsel model,
Swedish companies reportedly consider their lawyers to be strategic
partners rather than solely cops or gatekeepers. Of the 75 respondents,
85% reported that most business managers view lawyers as a “partner in
value creation,” with only 15% characterizing them as a “necessary evil.”
One Swedish respondent commented:
I have 8 years of experience as IHL and member of executive
team working in an environment with constant crisis. Under
these circumstances it is vital to stay within the legal
environment but also for the IHL to be hands on and help the
company find a solution rather than to point out obstacles.
With respect to the role of the lawyers in the formulation of strategy, 60%
of the seventy Swedish respondents strongly agreed or agreed that lawyers
are involved in the formation of strategy, 16% responded negatively, and
24% were neutral.
432. Id. at 466.
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Of the seventy-nine Swedish respondents, 58% reported that the head
of the legal department is a member of the TMT. One respondent
explained:
[I]n many old Swedish industrial companies (including my
company) the General Counsel are not a natural member of the
Group Management team. Both I and my predecessor have under
a long time argued for that [sic] the General Counsel should be a
member, as it underlines the importance the company puts on
legal compliance and that legal aspects are considered when
forming the company’s strategy.
For reference, Nelson and Nielsen found that 26% of the general counsel of
the U.S. respondents were members of the TMT.433 Sixty-seven percent of
the Swedish respondents indicated that the head of the legal department
reported to the CEO, with 22% reporting to the chief financial officer, 3%
to the corporate secretary, and 9% reporting to others.
Some of the data we collected raise concerns about Swedish attitudes
toward compliance. For example, when asked whether “complying with
the legal rules is seen by business managers as essential to financial
success,” only 69% of the seventy-five Swedish respondents strongly
agreed or agreed, 27% were neutral, and 4% disagreed. Only 61% of
Swedish respondents reported having a control and compliance function.
Of the firms that do have a control and compliance function, it is part of the
legal department in 56% of the responding firms. For example, one
Swedish respondent stated: “Re compliance: There is today no general
compliance department, but instead a department for financial internal
control. This is not part of the legal department.”
When asked to select one of four characterizations of their firm’s
approach to regulatory and legal compliance, 36% of the sixty-seven
Swedish respondents selected “Normative (compulsory instructions)”; 28%
selected “Advisory (suggestions, recommendations)”; 27% selected
“Normative with internal controls (compulsory instructions & audit)”; and
9% selected “Normative with penalties (compulsory instructions & audit &
penalties).” When asked to indicate all the listed ways by which the
respondent Swedish companies promote regulatory and legal compliance,
79% of the sixty-seven respondents selected “Adopting a good practices
code, an ethical charter or equivalent document specific to the company”;
70% selected “Offering training by IHLs or courses taught by IHLs for
some or all of the employees”; 48% selected “Distributing interna[l]
memos prepared by IHLs on rules to respect”; and 30% selected “Providing
an employment manual or similar booklet to every employee.” In response
433. Id. at 494.
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to the question, “Who spreads and promotes the legal policy in your
company (select all that apply)?,” 90% of the sixty-seven Swedish
respondents selected the head of the legal department; 31% selected the
CEO; and 15% selected the CFO; 3% selected the non-executive chair of
the board. For the 12% selecting other, the answers included: “Our CSR
policy is promoted by the Information Department,” all IHLs, compliance
officer, and local GMs.
Of the sixty-seven respondents, 7% reported that non-lawyers in their
company have no access to legal information 45% reported ongoing access
under the control of the legal department; 43% reported limited access
under the control of the legal department; and 25% reported unlimited
access (for example, a legal intranet) with a possibility to contact IHLs in
order to obtain further information.434
Only 69% of the seventy Swedish respondents agreed or strongly
agreed with the statement: “In my company, the board of directors expects
the head of the legal department to alert it to highly risky choices by
management”; 25% disagreed; and 6% were neutral. Also troubling is the
fact that 30% of Swedish respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that
their CEO would make an important decision without first consulting with
counsel; 13% were neutral; and only 47% disagreed or strongly disagreed.
In response to the statement, “Business managers in my company tend
to structure a deal then bring in the lawyers to document it,” only 30% of
the seventy-one Swedish respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed; 31%
were neutral; 38% agreed or strongly agreed. Of the seventy Swedish
respondents, 57% reported: “In my company, the approval documents for
most important projects have a place where IHLs can express their opinion
(disagreement, agreement, or caution); 21% were neutral; and 21%
disagreed or strongly disagreed. Even in Swedish firms without such a
formal mechanism, respondents reported various “other mechanisms
(formal or informal) whereby IHLs can express their opinion,” including:
• “There is no requirement that major contracts (i.e. with a
contract amount exceeding 500 KEUR) have to be approved or
commented by a LHI [sic]. However, there is a policy that
recommend[s] the business people to let a LHI [sic] review any
contract above that amount or if the contract is of a
complicated nature.”
•

“In the day to day business when meeting/working with
managers and management teams”

434. Percentages exceed 100% because respondents were asked to select any or all of the
four answers that applied.
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•

“In various business meetings”

•

“Informal personal meetings”

•

“Informally through the physical position in the building
(office next to the CEO) . . . . [sic]”

•

“When being consulted by management in [sic] specific issues,
at our Executive Group Management meetings (consisting of
top management and the Heads of Business Areas)”

•

“Short track to the CEO and CFO, participation in management
meetings, early participation in M&A projects and other
important business projects”

•

“Most of the IHLs participate at management forums (such as
subsidiary company management meetings) within their
respective field of responsibility. The very reason behind this
is to provide the IHL with the means to influence.”

•

“Most important projects are discussed in the management
group where head of legal is present”

•

“As member of the Group Management team where all issues
of this nature is [sic] presented and decided upon”

•

“Normal practice in our company to have lawyers on board
[o]n all important projects”

•

“All agreements are subject to a delegation of authority. All
agreements meeting certain criteria must be reviewed. All
major projects need a lawyer assigned. No formalized
process.”

The two Swedish responses best evidencing the proactive element of
legal and strategic astuteness were:
• “All legal documents as well as actions shall be approved by
IHL on [sic] beforehand. A[n] IHL in this case is very much
involved with business on top level, the job is normally done
before it becomes a legal document or action.”
•

“IHLs play an integrated role in the formation of business
opportunities as well as the execution of projects.”
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Although 30% of the sixty-seven Swedish respondents either strongly
agreed or agreed that the “top management team in my company uses law
as a strategic tool to create, protect, grow, and capture value,” only 35% of
the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that the “CEO of my
company understands the laws and regulations most important to our
business.” Fifty-two percent agreed, 9% were neutral, and 4% either
disagreed or strongly disagreed. Given the pervasive role the law plays in
both shaping the regulatory environment and providing tools for value
creation, the marshaling of resources, and the management of risk, this
apparent lack of legal literacy is troubling.
These findings and a number of major Swedish corporate scandals that
have occurred within the last fifteen years are early warning signs that call
for attention. Although the focus of blame for corporate wrongdoing has
not been on the outside lawyers or in-house counsel, but on the directors of
the board and the auditors of these Swedish firms, they invite Judge
Sporkin’s famous question: “Where were the lawyers?”435 Among the
scandals—well known in Sweden and in some cases also on the European
scene—are the ones involving Skandia, Prosolvia, HQ Bank, and
TeliaSonera.
In the first years of this millennium, the bonuses for management at
the large Swedish insurance company Skandia were tied to the share price,
which skyrocketed as a result of accounting methods based on a faulty
valuation.436 The CEO was forced out and prosecuted but eventually found
not guilty on appeal.437 The board resigned438 after heavy criticism for lack
of appropriate and effective internal controls, and the main auditor was
reprimanded by the disciplinary board for auditors. The value of the
Skandia shares decreased substantially and Skandia—an old, very
respected Swedish insurance company—was taken over by the South
African insurance company Old Mutual.439 Several legal proceedings
435. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990);
Guttman & Sporkin, supra note 67.
436. Skandal, ECONOMIST (Dec. 4, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/2273049;
Sweden: Special Investigation into Certain Practices of Skandia Insurance Company (Ltd),
MONDAQ.COM, http://www.mondaq.com/x/23663/http://www.mondaq.com/x/23663/
Special+Investigation+Into+Certain+Practices+Of+Skandia+Insurance+Company+Ltd
[perma.cc/W4TM-89NC] (last updated May 18, 2004).
437. MICHAEL J. JONES, CREATIVE ACCOUNTING, FRAUD AND INTERNATIONAL
ACCOUNTING SCANDALS 533 (2011); Ex-Skandia Boss Cleared, LOCAL (SE) (Dec. 19, 2007,
11:20 AM), http://www.thelocal.se/20071219/9452 [perma.cc/2E8R-284M].
438. Skandia: “A Bit More Down to Earth”, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 14, 2003),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2003-12-14/skandia-a-bit-more-down-to-earth
[perma.cc/FS4Z-2Q5C].
439. Old Mutual Seals Deal for Skandia, BBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2006, 20:15 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4652406.stm [perma.cc/A3CG-EAPJ].
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ensued.440
After the information technology company Prosolvia abruptly lost all
its value in 1998, the Appellate Court imposed liability on the main auditor
for damages amounting to sums never heard of before in Sweden, where
damage awards tend to be much lower than those in the United States.441
The government terminated HQ Bank’s right to carry on business as a
result of unethical trading in financial instruments.442 Management’s and
the board of directors’ liability is now being tried in court.443
In 2011, the large partly government-owned Nordic telecommunications company TeliaSonera was accused of bribing the leaders
of the dictatorship of Uzbekistan with billions of Swedish crowns (US $337
million) to secure a 3G-license in that country and a stake in the Uzbec
company Ucell.444 TeliaSonera is the largest publicly traded firm in
Sweden.445 In 2013 CEO Lars Nyberg and directors of the Board had to
resign;446 as of 2015, legal investigations of these actors were ongoing.447
Swedish regulators, bar, and judicial officials and in-house lawyers
would do well to heed America’s cautionary tale by preemptively
addressing issues that Americans addressed ex post facto. Even generally

440. JONES, supra note 437.
441. Id. at 363-65; Bo Thomaeus, € 230 Million Award in Landmark Case on Auditor’s
Negligence, INT’L LAW OFFICE (Sept. 30, 2013).
442. Dominic Chopping, Sweden’s HQ Investment Bank Faces Liquidation, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748703369704575461083275122508 [perma.cc/U3Q5-JPJR].
443. Patrick Lannin, Carnegie Buys Troubled Swedish Bank HQ for $37 mln, REUTERS
(Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/03/
hq-idUSLDE6820K220100903 [perma.cc/YX9A-XBC4].
444. Joanna Lillis, Uzbekistan’s First Daughter Accused of Pocketing $1bn in Phone
Deals, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/24/
gulnara-uzbekistan-daughter-corruption [perma.cc/M35J-LK6N]; Uzbekistan’s Gulnara
Karimova Linked to Telecoms Scandal, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20311886 [perma.cc/E6B4-KVKK].
445. Ola Westerberg, The TeliaSonera Scandals: A Swedish Trauma, ORGANIZED CRIME
AND
CORRUPTION
REPORTING
PROJECT
(May
29,
2015),
https://www.occrp.org/corruptistan/azerbaijan/azerbaijan-telecom/the-teliasonera-scandalsa-swedish-trauma.php [perma.cc/UWG6-6VK2].
446. Lillis, supra note 444; TeliaSonera CEO Quits amid Bribery Scandal, LOCAL (SE)
(Feb.
1,
2013,
11:19
GMT+01:00),
http://www.thelocal.se/20130201/45950
[perma.cc/VE5Z-WD6Q] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). Although TeliaSonera CEO Nyberg
denied breaking the law, he conceded that “we should not have gone ahead without learning
more about the identity of our counterparty.” Id.
447. Lillis, supra note 444. At the annual general meeting of TeliaSonera in 2014, the
new board chair Marie Ehrling stated that a report from the international law firm Norton
Rose Fulbright had concluded that “TeliaSonera was guilty of unethical, if not criminal,
practices in five countries beside Uzbekistan: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Nepal and
Tajikistan.” Westerberg, supra note 445.
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speaking, it is important to remember that general counsel and other IHLs
are unique members of the legal community in that they have a single
client, the employing corporation, which already could cast doubt on the
counsel’s ability to dispassionately serve their clients.448 Accordingly,
Sweden should consider enacting legislation mirroring Section 307 of the
SOX449 and Rule 1.13 of the American Bar Association’s (ABA’s) Model
Rules of Professional Conduct,450 which require general counsel to report
material violations of law by their companies “up-the-ladder.”451
Implementing such legislation would help ensure that Swedish boards of
directors are not blind-sided by any illegal activity occurring within their
corporations.
C. The Application of Our Prescriptions Outside the United States
We submit that legal and strategic astuteness are as important for inhouse lawyers outside of the United States and their clients as they are for
U.S. companies. In fact, they are especially needed in non-U.S.
jurisdictions where the moral hazards posed by Nelson and Nielsen’s
entrepreneurial lawyer exist but are not yet tempered by legislation or
professional norms.
The U.K presents the next most readily applicable context for our
prescriptions. Despite the national parity we discussed within the AngloAmerican nexus, the U.K. still lags behind the United States in certain key
respects, including the evolutionary state of its general counsel. The
rationale behind the LSA of 2007 evidences this lag in its attempt to boost
the U.K. legal market’s global competitiveness against its only real
competitor—the U.S. legal market. It aims to do so by permitting U.K. law
firms to accept foreign investment capital from foreign lawyers and nonlawyers alike. In many ways, this action goes beyond the American
experience. To wit, when confronting the same option, the “New York
State Bar Association has determinedly come out against such moves for
New York lawyers and firms, to the chagrin of the large New York City
law firms.”452 Unlike in the U.K., such moves constitute “heretical changes

448. The European Court of Justice identified this as a key reason to deny
communications with in-house lawyers attorney-client privilege. Case C-550/07 P, Akzo
Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-08301. See also DeMott, supra note 83, at
956 (“[A] general counsel’s dependence on a single client may call into question counsel’s
capacity to bring an appropriate degree of professional detachment to bear.”).
449. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2003).
450. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.13 (2013).
451. Kim, supra note 55, at 1040.
452. Flood, supra note 404, at 1120.
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to [the] American legal tradition.”453 This response suggests that Nelson
and Nielsen’s entrepreneurial lawyer may be waning in the American
context in the wake of SOX while it waxes in the U.K. context, poised to
create compliance problems in the future. Indeed, although “[l]arge UK
law firms have not been affected [by the LSA] yet,
[a]t some point in the future, possibly within the next five or ten
years, larger U.K. firms will be attracted to external financing or
taking the firm to market in an initial public offering. Then the
U.K. firms will have a significant advantage over the U.S. firms.
Furthermore, this will give them considerable benefits in the
global market. We only have to look at the success of the big
accounting firms to see how this could be achieved.454
Law firms, however, are not and should not be like accounting firms;
likewise, lawyers are not and should not act like accountants. If either
were, the legal profession would stand in danger, as Dean Kronman warns,
of losing its soul;455 lawyers would cease being officers of the court and
would strip themselves of the noble ethical standards to which the lawyerstatesman ideal holds them.
They would become entrepreneurial
lawyers——the ideal’s current professional antithesis.
At the partner level of international law offices in developing
countries, “expatriates or local nationals with extensive work experience in
the firms’ home countries (e.g., Britain or the United States) far outnumber
homegrown lawyers.”456 This suggests that globalizing forces transform
and supersede the local diversity these countries’ legal cultures would
otherwise offer in what some scholars dub a form of Schumpeterian
“creative destruction.”457 Herein lies the tension between globalization and
localization.
Consider India, which is both a representative and exceptional BRIC
nation. Many scholars consider India “an ideal site to study the effects of
globalization on lawyers”458 because of its exceedingly dynamic legal
environment. While its strong economic development indicators make it a
rising star on the global stage of emerging nations,459 it has historically
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. KRONMAN, supra note 120.
456. Liu, supra note 393, at 686.
457. Id. at 682.
458. Mihaela Papa & David B. Wilkins, Globalization, Lawyers, and India: Toward a
Theoretical Synthesis of Globalization Studies and the Sociology of the Legal Profession, 18
INT’L J. LEGAL. PROF. 175, 176 (2011).
459. Geoffrey Smith, It’s Official (Sort of): India to Overtake China as Fastest-growing
Major Economy, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/02/27/its-official-sort-of-india-to-overtake-china-as-fastest-

ARTICLE 4_BAGLEY 2-17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

WHO LET THE LAWYERS OUT?

2/17/16 7:39 PM

505

taken a protectionist stance on issues affecting the integrity of its legal
profession by “preclud[ing] foreign law firms from practising locally.”460
Notwithstanding India’s protectionist stance, “foreign lawyers . . . [work]
in India on a regular basis . . . [thereby] creating regulatory questions that
the large law firms have to discuss with Indian legal regulators.”461 These
discussions may be the means by which the Indian legal profession
progressively acquiesces in the globalizing forces it now resists. Although
most native Indian lawyers are general practitioners who lack specialization
(they “remain as courtroom litigators and are rarely involved in
transactional work”462), India currently enjoys a “rapidly expanding ‘inhouse counsel’ sector.”463
This confluence of factors makes India an ideal context in which to
examine the likelihood of Nelson and Nielsen’s entrepreneurial lawyer
taking hold over the emerging nation’s burgeoning IHL sector. Will the
context mirror the American experience? Current evidence suggests it will.
India is undergoing a “commoditization of the [legal] profession.”464
Further mirroring the American experience, a “newly emerging corporate
legal elite threatens the ‘essential’ nature of the Indian legal profession,”
entrepreneurializing what was otherwise a “noble heritage.”465 To the
extent that this characterization is accurate, the Indian legal profession may
soon suffer from the initial stages of what currently ails certain American
companies, making our prescriptions timely.
Herein lies the slippery professional slope that this Article identifies
and seeks to remedy retrospectively in the American context,
contemporaneously in the U.K. context, and prospectively in the Swedish
and Indian contexts. Too often lawyers, including general counsel, blithely
identify the significant potential gains offered by the entrepreneurial
lawyer, while failing to acknowledge its prohibitively expensive moral
hazards. By the time lawyers and their clients recognize the associated
costs, often irreparable damage has already occurred. An awareness of the
American legal experience, its problems, and our corresponding
prescriptions provides an antidote.

growing-major-economy/ [perma.cc/4S4T-YLEU].
460. John Flood, The Re-landscaping of the Legal Profession: Large Law Firms and
Professional Re-regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC. 507, 519 (2011).
461. Id.
462. Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2189, 2238 (2007).
463. Papa & Wilkins, supra note 458.
464. Id. at 203.
465. Id. at 177, 182.
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CONCLUSION

The role of general counsel in the corporate context currently sits at an
evolutionary crossroads; the function can either continue embracing the
negative entrepreneurial tendencies that, left unchecked, jeopardize the
firms general counsel serve, or it can aspire to the higher professional
standard of the lawyer-statesman ideal. This Article advocates the latter
option through its prescriptions of legal astuteness and strategic astuteness,
which taken together, provide the necessary antidote to the role’s current
ailment.
Business managers and their counsel can be more effective drivers of
both compliant corporate behavior and the creation of sustainable value
with integrity when they work together as strategic partners—that is, when
legally astute managers and strategically astute lawyers form heavyweight
teams.466 Legislative efforts, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
SOX, Dodd-Frank, and the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act,
have proved inadequate to prevent undue risk-taking and outright illegality.
Counsel need to more actively promote legal and ethical compliance, but so
do their corporate clients. Law, ethics, and compliance are just too
important to be left to the lawyers, so managers must be legally astute and
insist on lawyers who are strategically astute. Unfortunately, many
managers leave business school ill-equipped to manage the legal and
ethical aspects of business. Many lawyers lack the business expertise
necessary to be true partners in value creation. Law schools can help fill
that gap, just as business schools can promote ethics, legal literacy, and the
exercise of informed judgment.
Counsel who work hand-in-hand with managers to create realizable
value, marshal resources, and manage risk (both business and legal) must
guard against being coopted by their manager colleagues. But so must their
clients. Each individual in the firm has a role to play. We agree with
former Texaco CEO James Kinnear’s statement that “[f]ish rots from the
head.”467 Both lawyers and managers are more likely to be influenced by
what their leaders actually do, whom they hire and promote, whom and
how they compensate, criticize or praise, than by their exhortations. Are
whistle blowers punished and shunned or praised for their courage? Are
employees who cheat on their expense report sanctioned even if they are
top sales reps?
The evolving role of in-house counsel outside the United States poses
a risk that counsel will fall prey to the ethical pitfalls of Nelson and

466. Clark & Wheelwright, supra note 226.
467. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 201.
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Nielsen’s American entrepreneurial lawyer.
We submit that the
prescriptions we present in this Article can help firms both in the United
States and abroad and their managers and lawyers guard against the
destruction of value that occurs when companies fail to practice strategic
compliance management and violate societal expectations. They will also
reduce the likelihood of “[n]ew forms of regulation or effective
enforcement . . . without regard for feasibility or cost.”468

468. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 201, at 461. Accordingly, “government regulation is not
a good substitute for knowledgeable self-restraint.” Id.

